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IN RE WENDLAND: CONTRADICTION,
CONFUSION, AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
Mary Ann Buckley*
This is the hardest case.1
INTRODUCTION
The issue of medical treatment refusals for incompetent
patients is a relatively recent phenomenon, primarily due to
advances in medical treatment and technology that provide the
capability to support biologic life, if not necessarily cognitive
life, in circumstances that would have been impossible until
recently.2
In In re Wendland, the California Supreme Court held that a
conservator may not withhold artificial nutrition and hydration
from a minimally conscious patient in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence either that the patient had previously
expressed wishes to forgo such treatment or that doing so is in

*R.N.; Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; M.A. University of
Virginia, 1995; B.A. St. Mary’s College of Maryland, 1986; A.A.S.
Piedmont Virginia Community College, 1980. The author extends her heartfelt
thanks to Rachel Wrightson, George Barry and Erin O’Connor for their
invaluable editorial comments, and to Professor Marsha Garrison for her
guidance.
1
In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 553 (Ct. App. 2000).
2
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990); see
also Ronald E. Cranford, Modern Technology and the Care of the Dying, in
BIRTH TO DEATH: SCIENCE AND BIOETHICS 191-97 (David C. Thomasma &
Thomasine Kushner eds., 1996) (exploring changes in the process of dying
since the second World War).
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the patient’s best interest.3 With Wendland, California joined a
small but growing number of states that have adopted the clear
and convincing standard in these circumstances.4 The Wendland
court, however, was the first to determine that a lesser standard
would be unconstitutional.5 Because of the profound effect this
decision could have on a significant number of health care
decisions, it is important to examine the court’s reasoning to test
it for soundness.
This comment examines Wendland, challenging the court’s
reasoning. Part I briefly explores case law regarding medical
treatment refusals and legislative enactments based on the
Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (UHCDA).6 Part II discusses
the details of the Wendland case. Part III challenges the court’s
reasoning, focusing on four problems with the decision: (1)
Stating that its decision would affect only a “narrow class” of
patients, the court misperceived the scope of the decision’s
3

28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001), reh’g denied, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 6484 (2001).
“‘Conservator’ means a court-appointed conservator having authority to make
a health care decision for a patient.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 4613 (Deering
2001). A “surrogate” is one, other than a patient’s appointed agent or courtappointed conservator, who is authorized to make decisions for a patient. See,
e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4643 (Deering 2001).
4
Other states include Michigan, In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich.
1995); Missouri, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff’d sub
nom. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); New
Jersey, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1109 (N.J. 1985); New York, In re
Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y.
1988).
5
See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. The court examined the case in
the light of Article I, section 1, of the California Constitution, which
specifically lists privacy as an individual right, and noted that the
constitutional privacy provision protects against private conduct. Id. at 165.
While a full discussion of the issue of the existence of a federal constitutional
right to privacy is beyond the scope of this article, it is possible that other state
courts will adopt reasoning from Wendland when construing their own state
constitutions. It is also conceivable that the court’s reasoning could be
considered in examining the issue on a federal level.
6
UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT, 9 U.L.A. pt. I.B, 147-82 (1993)
[hereinafter UHCDA], available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/
1990s/uhcda93.htm.
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applicability;7 (2) while the court’s decision was ostensibly made
in the spirit of furthering individual autonomy, the opinion
actually has the opposite effect, since Californians are now either
forced to make decisions in a manner they would not have chosen
themselves or suffer the consequences of a default they likely
would not have chosen themselves;8 (3) the court’s dependence
on the use of written advance directives is misplaced, as is its
belief that oral appointment of surrogates adequately offsets the
consequences of failure to execute written advance directives;9
and (4) clear and convincing evidence, in contrast to the court’s
holding, is neither required nor appropriate for decisions to
withdraw treatment from incompetent patients.10 Part III also
proposes that the California legislature must now specify that the
preponderance of the evidence is sufficient for surrogates to
withdraw treatment from incompetent patients as long as other
statutory requirements are met. Furthermore, the legislature must
specify what procedural safeguards are sufficient to resolve
7

Wendland, 28 P.3d at 175.
Id. at 168.
9
Id. at 160-61, 172. The court relied on the use of advance directives
and oral appointment of surrogates to provide guidance as to the patient’s
wishes. Id. Advance directives are statements made by competent individuals
directing the kinds of care they would like to receive in the event of their
subsequent incapacity. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 152 (5th ed. 2001); see also David
Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV. 1255, 1258-59
(1994). Advance directives are governed by state law; California’s governing
provisions allow for written and oral advance directives and appointment of
agents and surrogates. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4670, 4711, 4684, 4714
(West 2003). The United States Congress supported the use of advance
directives via the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA). Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388, §
4206 (1990) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1991)) (including as a budget
amendment the PSDA, which requires healthcare providers to provide written
information to patients regarding their right to make advance directives, and to
provide additional education to staff and the community regarding advance
directives).
10
See Wendland, 28 P.3d at 174 (concluding that clear and convincing
evidence is required to prove that a conservatee either wished to refuse lifesustaining treatment or that it would be in his best interest).
8
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disputes, in order to keep such disputes out of the courts.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND11

Prior to Wendland, California case law was clear that
competent patients may refuse life-sustaining treatments, even
when not terminally ill, based on the California Constitution’s
Privacy clause.12 Prior to California’s adoption of its version of
the UHCDA, decisions for incompetent patients were either made
informally,13 or based on state laws governing advance directives
and court-appointed convervators.14 After the adoption of the
Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA), all treatment decisions for
incompetent patients, regardless of how the decision maker came
by that role, were to be guided by the same provisions of the
act.15
A. California Case Law
The right of competent persons in California to refuse
medical treatment was upheld in 1972 in Cobbs v. Grant.16 In
11

See generally Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A
Review of the Jurisprudence of Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182
(2001) (examining case law on the subject of medical treatment refusals more
comprehensively).
12
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. “All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” Id. See Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1984); Bartling v. Superior
Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984).
13
Health Care Decisions Act: Hearing on A.B. 891 Before the Senate
Rules Comm., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Senate
Rules Comm. Hearing on A.B. 891].
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972) (remanding a medical malpractice case for
retrial on the basis that it was unclear on what theory the jury reached its
verdict when there was insufficient evidence to show negligence but when it
was possible that the patient had not given informed consent).
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Cobbs, the court held that a patient has the right to disclosure of
his choices in regard to treatment, and the risks inherent in those
choices.17 The court based that right on the right of the patient to
refuse treatment.18 The right of competent patients to refuse even
life-sustaining treatments was subsequently upheld in Bartling v.
Superior Court in 1984.19 In Bartling, a competent patient was
being treated with mechanical ventilation due to chronic
respiratory failure, emphysema, a lung tumor and other serious
medical problems.20 He sought an injunction to order the hospital
and his physicians to disconnect the ventilator, but the lower
court refused, claiming that such treatments could only be
withdrawn if the patient was comatose and only in the absence of
a reasonable possibility of recovery.21 The appellate court
reversed, noting that the right to refuse treatment is an “obvious
corollary” to the notion expressed in Cobbs that treatment given
in the absence of informed consent constitutes a battery.22
The right to refuse feeding and hydration was extended to
patients who are not terminally ill in Bouvia v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County.23 Elizabeth Bouvia was completely immobile
as a result of cerebral palsy, quadriplegia and arthritis, and was
dependent on others for all aspects of her care.24 Her physicians
17

Id. at 10.
Id. at 9.
19
209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a patient has the right
to have mechanical ventilation discontinued despite objections of physicians
and hastening of his death).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986). The right to refuse treatment was
also held to apply to prisoners in Thor v. Superior Court of Solano County,
855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993) (holding that, in the absence of evidence of a threat
to institutional security or public safety, an inmate may not be denied the
freedom to refuse all medical treatment). The Wendland court erred in
referring to Elizabeth Bouvia as a terminally ill patient; she was paralyzed,
confined to a wheelchair, and suffering from cerebral palsy, but was not
terminally-ill. See GREGORY PENCE, CLASSIC CASES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 25,
29 (1990).
24
Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
18

BUCKLEYMACRO1-20.DOC

260

4/1/03 2:43 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

inserted a feeding tube against her will and she sought an
injunction requiring that the tube be removed.25 The trial court
denied her request, but the appellate court granted her relief.26 In
granting relief, the court relied in part on Cobbs and Bartling.27
B. Development of Case Law on the Use of the “Clear and
Convincing” Standard
Prior to Wendland, courts in Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey
and New York had adopted the clear and convincing standard for
refusal of medical treatment by surrogates.28 The United States
Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to require the standard
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.29
With In re Conroy, New Jersey became the first state to
require clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s previouslystated wishes to refuse medical treatment.30 Claire Conroy was a
25

Id. at 298.
Id. Despite the court’s decision, Ms. Bouvia did not elect to exercise
the option granted by the court to starve herself. See PENCE, supra note 23, at
44.
27
Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300-02. The court also relied on Barber v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006 (Ct. App.
1983) (issuing a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower court from proceeding
on murder charges filed against physicians who discontinued medical
treatment from a comatose patient) The Barber court held that the physicians
had no legal duty to act and that failure to act, therefore, was not grounds for
proceedings. Id. at 1022. Furthermore, the court found that withdrawal of
treatment is equivalent to withholding it, id. at 1016, and noted that “a murder
prosecution is a poor way to design an ethical and moral code for doctors.” Id.
at 1011.
28
See In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995); Cruzan v. Harmon,
760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1984); In re
Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y.
1988).
29
497 U.S. 261 (1990). See infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text
(discussing the case).
30
486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1984). Courts throughout the United States have
looked to New Jersey for guidance in cases regarding medical treatment
refusals, since New Jersey was often the first to confront the issues. See In re
26
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terminally-ill, elderly, incompetent patient living in a nursing
home.31 She had a history of refusing medical care and
expressing discomfort with hospitals and medical treatment.32 Her
nephew had sought to withdraw artificial nutrition and
hydration.33 Despite Ms. Conroy’s death during the course of
litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court seized the opportunity
to attempt to clarify decision-making standards by defining three
such standards: “subjective,” “limited objective” and “pure
objective.”34 In an attempt to keep such decisions out of the
courts, the Conroy court set up procedural methods by which
such decisions could be made.35 The court rejected distinctions
between death that results from treatment termination and death
Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987) (allowing the withdrawal of feeding tube
from a patient in a persistent vegetative state based on clear and convincing
evidence of the patient’s wishes for such treatment to be withdrawn); Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209 (recognizing that the right to refuse treatment survives
incapacity and prescribing procedural safeguards for patients in nursing
homes); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (allowing withdrawal of
ventilator treatment from a patient in a persistent vegetative state). New Jersey
was the first explicitly to find a distinction between suicide and the refusal of
treatment. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 (noting “a real distinction between
the self-infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination against artificial life
support or radical surgery, for instance”). See Cantor, supra note 11, at 183
(reviewing the history of treatment refusal cases).
31
Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1216.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 1218.
34
Id. at 1229-33. The court held that the subjective standard could be
used to refuse treatment on an individual’s behalf when there is clear evidence
that the individual would have made that choice; the “limited objective” test
should be used when there is some trustworthy evidence that the individual
would have wanted to terminate treatment and the burden of prolonging life,
as a result of pain and suffering, significantly outweighed the benefits of a
prolonged life; and the “pure objective” test would allow for the termination
of treatment only when the individual’s physical suffering would make the
treatment inhumane. Id. at 1231-33.
35
Id. at 1241-42. The procedures included determination of the
incompetency of the individual, notification of the Office of the Ombudsman
(an office designated to investigate allegations of abuse in nursing homes), and
confirmation by two independent physicians confirming the attending
physician’s assessment of the patient’s medical condition and prognosis. Id.
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that results from allowing a person to die of his disease,36 and
between artificial feeding and other life-sustaining medical
treatments.37 Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted
that Conroy was limited to elderly, incompetent patients with
some ability to interact with the environment.38
Three years later, in In re Westchester County Medical
Center ex rel. O’Connor, New York became the next to require
clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s wishes to have
treatment withdrawn.39 While continuing to recognize the
individual’s right to refuse treatment, the court refused to allow
one to make such an assertion for another on the basis that no
court or other person should decide what is an acceptable quality
of life for another.40 Over the objections of family members, the
court allowed the hospital to continue providing artificial feeding
to Mary O’Connor, who became incompetent after having several
strokes.41 Here, the court failed to find clear and convincing
evidence that O’Connor would have chosen to refuse the
treatment, despite evidence of repeated expressions of her beliefs
over a period of almost twenty years in response to the deaths of
a number of her relatives.42 The court defined “clear and
convincing” as the level of proof sufficient to convince the
36

Id. at 1236 (noting that “[c]haracterizing conduct as active or passive is
often an elusive notion, even outside the context of medical decisionmaking . . . [t]he distinction is particularly nebulous, however, in the context
of decisions whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment”).
37
Id. at 1234. The court, however, recognized the “emotional
significance” of food. Id. What the court did not specify was whether it
considered the emotional significance to be for the individual being fed or for
those doing the feeding, an important distinction in deciding the benefits and
burdens for the patient of continuing artificial feeding. See id.
38
In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987) (refusing to require the tests and
procedures of Conroy prior to withdrawal of treatment for patients in a
persistent vegetative state).
39
531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
40
Id. at 613.
41
Id. at 608.
42
Id. (noting that O’Connor’s statements were primarily in response to
deaths from cancer of her husband, stepmother and the “last two” of her nine
brothers).
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factfinder “as far as is humanly possible, that the strength of the
individual’s beliefs and the durability of the individual’s
commitment to those beliefs makes a recent change of heart
unlikely.”43 Although the O’Connor court rejected the term
“substituted judgment,” it utilized what is usually considered a
substituted judgment standard.44
Missouri followed New Jersey and New York, requiring the
clear and convincing standard in Cruzan v. Harmon.45 Nancy
Beth Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state (“PVS”) as a
result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident.46 Here, the
Supreme Court of Missouri found that evidence of the patient’s
wishes to have artificial nutrition and hydration withdrawn was
“inherently unreliable” and refused to authorize her parents to
have such treatment discontinued.47 The court held that the state’s
interest in preserving Nancy’s life and that of others like her, in
the face of a minimal burden on Nancy to continue living,
outweighed her right to have treatment discontinued.48
Additionally, the court noted that the issue of such decisions is
one of policy, which is best left to the legislature, and that
legislative action would be required in order to overcome the
43

Id. at 613 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id.
45
760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
46
Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 410-11. Nancy’s parents requested that her
artificial nutrition and hydration be withdrawn, but the hospital refused to do
so without court approval. Id. at 268. The trial court authorized the
termination of treatment but the State Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the State Constitution—and probably the U.S. Constitution—provided no broad
right to privacy that would allow for unfettered exercise of a right to refuse
treatment, that the State had a policy strongly favoring the preservation of life
and that Cruzan’s statements to her roommate were insufficient to establish her
wish not to receive treatment under her current circumstances. Id. PVS is a
state in which the patient has sleep/wake cycles but exhibits no cognitive
awareness of or substantial reaction to the surroundings. PRINCIPLES OF
NEUROLOGY 347 (Raymond D. Adams et al. eds., 6th ed. 1997).
47
Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d. at 426. The trial court found that “Nancy
expressed, in ‘somewhat serious conversation’ that if sick or injured she would
not want to continue her life unless she could live ‘halfway normally.’” Id. at
411.
48
See id. at 426.
44
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current state presumption in favor of life.49
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.50 In its
subsequent opinion, the Court noted the confusion in the various
courts over the basis of the right to refuse treatment and the
appropriate standard to apply in cases involving incompetent
patients.51 The sole question before the Court was “whether the
United States Constitution prohibits Missouri from choosing the
rule of law which it did.”52 In a plurality opinion, the Court held
that the United States Constitution did not bar a state from
requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent’s
wishes.53 The Court also recognized a liberty interest under the
Due Process Clause for a competent person to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, and assumed that such right would include the
refusal of nutrition and hydration.54 Whether such a right has
been violated must be determined by balancing the individual’s
liberty interest against the relevant state interests.55
49

See id. Specifically, the court stated, “[I]f there is to be a change
in . . . policy, it must come from the people through their elected
representatives.” Id.
50
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 492 U.S. 917 (1989).
51
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (pointing
out that the cases on the subject “demonstrate both similarity and diversity in
their approaches to decision of what all agree is a perplexing question with
unusually strong moral and ethical overtones”).
52
Id. at 277.
53
See id. at 285. The Court did not explicitly state that the standard was
constitutionally required, but discussed it approvingly. Id. at 283.
54
See id. at 284.
55
Id. at 279. The Court held that it was permissible for Missouri to apply
a clear and convincing evidence standard when the individual interests at stake
are particularly important. Id. at 283. The Court cited Missouri’s interest as a
general interest in the protection and preservation of human life; the Court
stated that Missouri may: 1) seek to “safeguard the personal element of [an
individual’s] choice” between life and death; 2) guard against “potential
abuses” by surrogates who may not act to protect the patient;” 3) consider that
“a judicial proceeding regarding an incompetent’s wishes may very well not
be an adversarial one, with the added guarantee of accurate factfinding that the
adversary process brings with it;” and 4) decline “to make judgments about
the ‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an
unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the
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Additionally, the Court determined that the Constitution does
not require a State to accept the substituted judgment of close
family members without substantial proof that their views reflect
the patient’s.56 The Court further noted that “favored treatment of
traditional family relationships . . . may not be turned around
into a constitutional requirement that a State must recognize”
such decision making.57
Justice O’Connor noted in her concurring opinion, however,
that the plurality decision did not decide whether a State must
give effect to the decisions of a surrogate.58 She concluded that,
in order to protect the patient’s liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment, the State may have a constitutionally required
duty to do so.59 In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Marshall and Blackmun, Justice Brennan stated that Cruzan had a
fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and
hydration that is not outweighed by any interest of the State.60
The dissenters found that the standard required by Missouri
impermissibly burdened that right.61
Michigan was the first state after Cruzan, and the last before
Wendland, to apply the clear and convincing standard to
treatment refusals by surrogates.62 In In re Martin, a case
constitutionally protected interests of the individual.” Id. at 281.
56
See id. at 286. The Court did not discuss what might constitute
“substantial proof.” See id.
57
Id. The Court, however, did not disallow states’ recognition of such
decision making. Id.
58
Id. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
59
Id. Justice O’Connor’s suggested means of protecting the liberty
interest in refusing medical treatment included durable powers of attorney and
health care proxies, but she did not mention statutory appointment of family
members or due process procedural safeguards in the absence of any of the
above. Id. at 290-91.
60
Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 350 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (opining that the best interests of the individual should prevail over
general state policy).
61
Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “Nancy Cruzan has a
fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration,
which right is not outweighed by any interests of the State”).
62
In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995).
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remarkably similar factually to the Wendland case, Michael
Martin suffered head injuries as the result of an accident, leaving
him severely impaired, both physically and neurologically,
although he was not in a vegetative state.63 His wife sought to
discontinue artificial nutrition and hydration based on previous
statements he had made, but was opposed by his mother and
sister.64 The Martin court noted that a “necessary corollary of
the . . . right to consent is the right not to consent.”65 Despite this
acknowledgement, the court set the burden of proof for refusals
by surrogates significantly higher than for consent.66
Thus, by the time the California Supreme Court heard
Wendland, four states had judicially-mandated standards that
required clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s previously
expressed wishes to have treatment withdrawn in circumstances

63

See id. at 402-03.
Id. at 402. In Martin, Michael Martin’s level of functioning may have
been greater than that of Robert Wendland, and there is some question as to
the motives of his spouse. See Andrew J. Broder & Ronald E. Cranford,
“Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary, How Was I to Know?” Michael Martin,
Absolute Prescience, and the Right to Die in Michigan, 72 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 787 (1995) (describing Michael as “conscious but unable to
communicate, except through head nods, and even then not in a consistent,
meaningful manner;” and noting that “Mary consulted with nurses, doctors,
lawyers, clergy and a bioethics committee regarding the withdrawal of
Michael’s artificial means of life-support. Through those consultations, Mary
sought to address all medical, ethical, religious, and legal aspects of the
decision to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from Michael”). Cf.
John H. Hess, Looking for Traction on the Slippery Slope: A Discussion of the
Michael Martin Case, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 105 (1995) (reporting that
Michael’s abilities included smiling frequently, indicating his desire to
participate in therapy, using a communication device until Mary transferred
him to a different facility and enjoying recreational activities; describing
Mary’s attempts to keep information from other family members; and citing
others claims that she engaged in extramarital relationships even at the time of
the court proceedings, that she had financial motives and that she was biased
against persons with disabilities).
65
Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 405.
66
See id. at 407. The court accepted the notion that the right to refuse
treatment could survive incompetency and be asserted on a person’s behalf,
but allowed only a purely subjective standard. Id. at 407-08.
64
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similar to what the patient was then experiencing.67 The United
States Supreme Court allowed but did not require that standard in
order to satisfy constitutional requirements.68
C. California and the UHCDA
Legislatures have responded to confusion in the courts by
enacting legislation regulating advance directives, health care
powers of attorney and surrogate decision making.69 Every state
has enacted either a health care power of attorney statute or a
living will statute.70 Thirty-five states have enacted surrogate
decision-making
statutes
of
varying
degrees
of
comprehensiveness.71 California enacted the HCDA in 1999.72

67

See supra Part I.B (discussing the cases from those four states).
Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Justice Scalia raised the issue of
treatment termination as a deliberate means to end life, stating that refusal of
medical treatment is equivalent to suicide. Id. at 293-99 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). The Court rejected that position in 1997. See Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793 (1997). In Vacco, physicians challenged the constitutionality of New
York statutes criminalizing the act of aiding a person to commit or attempt to
commit suicide, on the basis that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution. Id. at 798. They argued that since patients on life-sustaining
treatment could request its discontinuance, knowing it would lead to their
death, then patients who were not on life-sustaining treatments were thus
treated differently. Id. Justice Scalia joined without comment in the majority
opinion that rejected this argument, despite his comment to the contrary in
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (equating decisions to
refuse treatment with suicide).
69
See generally Mark Stephen Bishop, Note, Crossing the Decisional
Abyss: An Evaluation of Surrogate Decision-Making Statutes as a Means of
Bridging the Gap Between Post-Quinlan Red Tape and the Realization of an
Incompetent Patient’s Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 7
ELDER L.J. 153, 155 (1999) (reviewing various legislative enactments
regulating health care decisions).
70
Id. at 155 n.4 (citing American Bar Association Commission on Legal
Problems of the Elderly).
71
Id. at 155-56, 168-78 (comparing surrogate statutes from Illinois, New
Mexico and Ohio, as representative of the various types).
72
1999 Cal. Stat. 658 § 12.
68
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1. The UHCDA

The UHCDA was drafted and approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1993
and was approved by the American Bar Association in 1994.73
The purpose of the Act was to achieve more uniformity in
decision making from state to state, but it has had limited success
due to the number of states that had previously enacted statutes.74
The UHCDA has been adopted in some form by six states,
including California.75 All of the states other than California that
have adopted the UHCDA include “comprehensive provisions”
based on the UHCDA for decision making by surrogates.76
73

UHCDA, supra note 6.
David M. English, Note, The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act and
its Progress in the States, 15 A.B.A. PROB. & PROP. 19-20 (2001) (reviewing
the utilization of the UHCDA by states).
75
Id. at 20. The other states are Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi,
and New Mexico. Id. Delaware restricts those eligible to use advance
directives to patients who are terminally ill or permanently unconscious, and
both Delaware and Maine restrict withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining
treatment decisions by surrogates to patients who are terminally ill or
permanently unconscious. Id. at 20-21. Hawaii prohibits the withdrawing or
withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration by a surrogate unless two
physicians certify that the treatment is “merely prolonging the act of dying and
that the patient is unlikely to have any neurological response.” Id. at 21.
76
Id. at 20. Delaware provides a list from which a surrogate shall be
chosen, in descending order of priority: spouse (with some exceptions), adult
child, parent, adult sibling or adult grandchild. 16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §
2507 (2001). Hawaii requires a consensus among potential surrogates as to
who will serve as surrogate, in the absence of which they may seek
appointment as guardian. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-5 (2002). Maine provides
a list similar to Delaware except that the list includes “an adult who shares an
emotional, physical and financial relationship with the patient similar to that of
a spouse” after spouse in priority, and adds at the end of the list adult nieces
or nephews, adult aunts or uncles, and “another adult relative of the patient,
related by blood or adoption, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values
and is reasonably available for consultation.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A,
§ 5-805 (West 2001). Mississippi also provides a list of surrogates similar to
Delaware but without grandchildren. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-211 (2001).
New Mexico also provides a list of surrogates similar to Delaware, except but
New Mexico also provides for significant others after spouses, and substitutes
74
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2. California’s Adoption of the UHCDA
Prior to adopting a version of the UHCDA, California
provided no formal rules for making decisions regarding medical
treatment of incapacitated individuals.77 California adopted the
Act to create uniform rules and standards for medical decision
making for incapacitated persons so the same rules apply
regardless of how the decision maker was chosen.78 California’s
law does not include the UHCDA’s hierarchical ordering of
family members for surrogate decision making when
incapacitated patients have not named a health care proxy or
surrogate, but does specify that domestic partners have the same
rights as spouses to make medical decisions.79 California included
provisions allowing for oral advance directives and oral
appointment of surrogates, unlike some other states that have

grandparents for adult grandchildren. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5 (Michie
2002).
77
Senate Rules Committee Hearing on A.B. 891, supra note 13.
78
Id. According to the California Law Commission, the impetus for the
law was a series of cases in which decisions had been made for patients by
providers either using or disregarding guidance from surrogates or family
members. Health Care Decisions Act: Hearing on A.B. 891 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (hereinafter Senate
Judiciary Comm. Hearing on A.B. 891). The cited cases included Duarte v.
Chino Comm. Hosp., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that since
health care providers are immune from damages from failure to comply with
advance directives they are therefore also immune when there is no directive);
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983) (finding that
failure to provide medical treatment when the patient has no chance of
recovery is not an unlawful failure to perform a legal duty); and Cobbs v.
Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972) (finding that physicians have a duty of
reasonable disclosure of available choices of medical therapies and the dangers
both potential to as well as inherent in each choice, i.e., a duty of informed
consent). The rules were intended to apply equally whether the surrogate is a
family member or friend, a surrogate named in an advance directive, a public
guardian, or a court “making health care decisions as a last resort.” Senate
Judiciary Comm. Hearing on A.B. 891, supra.
79
CAL. PROB. CODE § 4716(a) (Deering 2001). See UHCDA § 5, supra
note 6, at 167-68.
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adopted the UHCDA.80 California also limited oral designation of
a surrogate to the course of treatment, illness or other health care
institution stay during which the designation was made.81
3. California Probate Code Section 2355
California adopted the HCDA in 1999, four months after the
appellate court filed its decision in Wendland and before the
California Supreme Court heard the case.82 The HCDA amended
section 2355 of the California Probate Code, governing decisions
by conservators.83
80

Delaware omitted the provision recognizing oral instructions, and both
Maine and New Mexico provided additional safeguards. See English, supra
note 74, at 20.
81
Id. at 23. The act was subsequently amended to limit the authority of
orally appointed surrogates to “the course of treatment or illness or during the
stay in the health care institution when the surrogate decision is made, or for
60 days, whichever period is shorter.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 4711(b) (West
2003).
82
1999 Cal. Stat. 658 § 12. The HCDA became effective July 1, 2000;
the appellate court had filed its decision on February 24, 2000. Wendland, 93
Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (Ct. App. 2000).
83
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355 (Deering 2001). From the time of its
enactment in 1979 to the effective date of its amendment in 2000, section
2355(a) provided:
If the conservatee has been adjudicated to lack the capacity to give
informed consent for medical treatment, the conservator has the
exclusive authority to give consent for such medical treatment to be
performed on the conservatee as the conservator in good faith based
on medical advice determines to be necessary and the conservator
may require the conservatee to receive such medical treatment,
whether or not the conservatee objects.
CAL. PROB. CODE, § 2355(a) (West 1998) (amended 1999), quoted in
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 163. After amendment, section 2355 provided:
If the conservatee has been adjudicated to lack the capacity to make
health care decisions, the conservator has the exclusive authority to
make health care decisions for the conservatee that the conservator in
good faith based on medical advice determines to be necessary. The
conservator shall make health care decisions for the conservatee in
accordance with the conservatee’s individual health care instructions,
if any, and other wishes to the extent known to the conservator.
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a. Section 2355 Prior to the HCDA
Prior to its amendment, section 2355 included no language
regarding the applicability of informal statements made by the
conservatee while competent.84 In In re Drabick,85 the California
Court of Appeal accepted that the former section 2355 allowed a
conservator to withhold artificial nutrition and hydration from a
patient in PVS and interpreted section 2355 as restricting the role
of courts in supervising conservators’ treatment decisions.86 The
Drabick court also accepted that the conservator would be bound
by the conservatee’s formal health care directions, but rejected
the idea that a conservator would be bound to honor prior
informal statements regarding continuation or cessation of
treatment.87 Finally, the Drabick court concluded that the
decision would be based on the conservator’s assessment of the
conservatee’s best interests, while considering the conservatee’s
prior statements as relevant and worthy of consideration in good
faith.88
Thus, as originally enacted, section 2355 provided that a
conservator must follow the dictates of an advance directive, but
made no provision for utilization of informal statements as to the
patient’s wishes. After Drabick, conservators could utilize
informal statements in determining a patient’s best interests but
were not required to do so.
Otherwise, the conservator shall make the decision in accordance
with the conservator’s determination of the conservatee’s best
interest. In determining the conservatee’s best interest, the
conservator shall consider the conservatee’s personal values to the
extent known to the conservator. The conservator may require the
conservatee to receive the health care, whether or not the conservatee
objects.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (Deering 2001) (altered provisions italicized).
84
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (Deering 2001); CAL. PROB. CODE §
2355(a) (West 1998) (amended 1999); see supra note 83 (quoting the older
and amended provision).
85
245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988).
86
Id. at 857-58.
87
Id. at 856.
88
Id. at 857.
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b. Section 2355 After Amendment

After its amendment, section 2355 made both formal and
informal statements of the conservatee binding on the conservator
to the extent that they are known.89 It codified the provision of
the UHCDA that required the conservatee’s personal values to be
considered in determining his best interests when his wishes are
unknown.90 The new version of section 2355, therefore, provides
for decisional standards that utilize to the degree possible the
knowledge the conservator has about the wishes and values of the
conservatee.91
Whereas the old section 2355 recognized only written
advance directives, the amended version gives effect to oral
directives as well.92 Lastly, the California Law Commission
stated that the burden of proof for the determination of the
conservatee’s wishes or best interests under section 2355 is met
by a preponderance of the evidence.93

89

CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (Deering 2001).
Id.; see also UHCDA, supra note 6.
91
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (Deering 2001). The amended version
adds a “substituted judgment” provision that not only shall the conservator
“make health care decisions for the conservatee in accordance with the
conservatee’s individual health care instructions, if any” but shall also use
“other wishes to the extent known to the conservator.” Id.
92
Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (Deering 2001) with CAL. PROB.
CODE § 2355(a) (West 1998) (amended 1999); see supra note 83 (quoting both
provisions). The apparent purpose of this change is to honor the wishes of an
individual who has not executed a written advance directive. Id.
93
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 166.
90
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II. IN RE WENDLAND94
A. Facts and Procedural History
Robert Wendland was an auto parts salesman from Stockton,
California.95 He developed a drinking problem after the death of
his father-in-law, who had been maintained on a ventilator while
dying from gangrene.96 While watching his father-in-law in that
condition, Robert told his wife, Rose, “I would never want to
live like that, and I wouldn’t want my children to see me like
that, and look at the hurt you’re going through as an adult seeing
your father like that.”97 Robert told Rose that her father
“wouldn’t want to live like a vegetable” and “wouldn’t want to
live in a comatose state.”98
Both Rose and Robert’s brother, Michael, became concerned
about Robert’s safety because of his drinking.99 Michael told
him, “I’m going to get a call from Rosie one day, and you’re
going to be in a terrible accident.”100 Upon Michael’s warning
that he would end up laying in bed “just like a vegetable,”
Robert responded, “Mike, whatever you do[,] don’t let that
happen. Don’t let them do that to me.”101 According to one of his
children, Robert said during that conversation that “if he could
not be a provider for his family, if he could not do all the things
94

This comment will follow the convention used by the Wendland courts,
referring to the members of the Wendland family by their first names. See 93
Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (Ct. App. 2000); see also 28 P.3d 151. The purpose of this
convention for this comment is to be consistent with the convention in the
Wendland cases, to distinguish one family member from another, and to
distinguish references to the court’s opinion from references to the individuals
involved.
95
Harriet Chiang, Right-to-Die Case Loses in State Court; Feeding Can’t
Halted [sic] if Patient is Conscious, S. F. CHRON. Aug. 10, 2001 at A1.
96
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 157.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
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that he enjoyed doing, just enjoying the outdoors, just basic
things, feeding himself, talking, communicating, if he could not
do those things, he would not want to live.”102 Rose testified that
Robert “made clear” to her that under no circumstances would he
want to live if he had to have diapers, if he had to have life
support, if he had to be kept alive with a feeding tube or if he
could not be a “husband, father, provider.”103
Robert was severely injured in an automobile accident in
September 1993, as a result of his driving while intoxicated.104
He remained in a coma for sixteen months.105 Although he
eventually regained consciousness, he was left both mentally and
physically disabled.106
Prior to regaining consciousness, Robert received fluid and
nutrition through a surgically-placed feeding tube inserted into
his small intestine.107 He first began to show signs of

102

Id.
In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 557-58 (Ct. App. 2000).
104
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 154.
105
Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554. Coma is “a state of profound
unconsciousness from which one cannot be roused.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 385 (27th ed. 2000); see also PRINCIPLES OF NEUROLOGY, supra
note 46, at 346-47 (defining coma and PVS). While Robert was in a coma,
Rose visited him daily, sometimes with their children. Wendland, 28 P.3d at
154.
106
According to a medical report submitted to the court, Robert had the
following medical conditions:
[S]evere cognitive impairment that is not possible to fully appreciate
due to the concurrent motor and communication impairments . . .
; maladaptive behavior characterized by agitation, aggressiveness and
non-compliance; severe paralysis on the right and moderate paralysis
on the left; severely impaired communication without compensatory
augmentative communication system; severe swallowing dysfunction,
dependent upon non-oral enteric tube feeding for nutrition and
hydration; incontinence of bowel and bladder; moderate spasticity;
mild to moderate contractures; general dysphoria; recurrent medical
illnesses, including pneumonia, bladder infections, sinusitus; and
dental issues.
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 155.
107
Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554-55.
103

BUCKLEYMACRO1-20.DOC

4/1/03 2:43 PM

IN RE WENDLAND

275

responsiveness in late 1994 and early 1995.108 Between January
and July of 1995, Robert’s feeding tube dislodged four times.109
Rose authorized surgical replacement of the tube the first three
times but refused the fourth.110 Dr. Kass, Robert’s physician,
inserted a nasogastric feeding tube while awaiting review of the
situation by the hospital ethics committee.111 The hospital ethics
committee stated no objection to the removal of the feeding tube,
and both Dr. Kass and the county patient ombudsman supported
the decision.112 Robert’s estranged mother, Florence, and sister
were not consulted, however, and filed for a temporary
restraining order to block removal of the feeding tube after
learning of the decision.113 Rose then petitioned to be appointed
as Robert’s conservator and asked the court to confirm her
authority to withhold nutrition and hydration.114
The court appointed Rose as conservator but delayed deciding
whether to authorize her to have the feeding tube removed and
ordered her to continue the current course of therapy for sixty
days.115 Sixty days elapsed with no change in Robert’s condition,
and Rose again asked the court for authority to remove the
feeding tube.116 Florence asked the court to appoint independent
counsel for Robert, but the trial court declined and the appellate
court denied her petition for writ of mandate.117 The California
108

Wendland, 28 P.3d at 154 (citing the medical report submitted to the
court, but not specifying what signs of responsiveness were noticed).
109
Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 155. See Lawrence J. Nelson & Ronald E.
Cranford, Michael Martin and Robert Wendland: Beyond the Vegetative State,
15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 427, 435 (1999) (describing Robert
Wendland’s relationship with his mother and sister). Florence learned of the
plan via an anonymous phone call. Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555.
114
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 155.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. A writ of mandate is “an order from an appellate court directing a
lower court to take a specified action.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (7th
ed. 1999).
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Supreme Court ultimately granted review and transferred the case
to the appellate court, which directed the trial court to appoint
counsel for Robert; his counsel subsequently supported Rose’s
decision.118
Despite support for Rose’s decision by his counsel, his
physician and the ethics committee, the trial court found that
Robert’s statements to his wife and brother while he was
competent were not enough to show by clear and convincing
evidence that he would have wanted to die if he were minimally
conscious.119 The trial court held that a conservator could
withhold artificial nutrition and hydration from a minimally
conscious conservatee if shown by clear and convincing evidence
to be in the conservatee’s best interest, considering any wishes
the conservatee may have previously expressed.120 The court
found that Rose had not met her burden.121 Nonetheless, the court
found that Rose had acted in good faith and allowed her to
continue as conservator, though she would not be permitted to
withdraw nutrition and hydration.122
The appellate court reversed, upholding the lower court’s
burden of proof standard but finding that the trial court erred in
substituting its own judgment as to Robert’s best interest.123
Applying In re Drabick,124 the court noted that the conservator
must make the final treatment decision “regardless of how much
or how little information about the conservatee’s preferences is
available.”125 The appellate court then held that the trial court’s
sole role should have been to determine whether Rose had
118

Wendland, 28 P.3d at 155.
Id. at 157; see supra text accompanying notes 97-103 (discussing
Robert’s statements).
120
See Wendland, 28 P.3d at 156.
121
Id. at 156-57.
122
Id.
123
In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 579 (Ct. App. 2000).
124
245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988).
125
Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562 (quoting Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at
857). The court did not explain why a clear and convincing standard was
appropriate in this case; the California Supreme Court later noted that the
usual standard is preponderance of the evidence. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 166.
119
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considered Robert’s interests in good faith but remanded to
permit Florence to present evidence rebutting Rose’s case.126 The
California Supreme Court granted review of the decision.127
Robert died of pneumonia in July 2001.128 His death occurred
after oral argument but prior to the issuance of an opinion.129 The
California Supreme Court retained the case for decision because
it raised “important issues” that tend to “evade review” due to
the health of those the cases typically concern.130
B. The Wendland Opinion
In Wendland, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed a
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment but was clearly
reluctant to authorize the exercise of that right through a third
party.131 The court held that a conservator may not withhold
artificial nutrition and hydration from a minimally conscious
patient in the absence of clear and convincing evidence either that
the patient had previously expressed wishes to forgo such
treatment or that doing so is in the patient’s best interest.132

126

Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579-80.
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 158.
128
Chiang, supra note 95. It appears that Rose may have had the
authority to refuse to authorize the provision of antibiotics to Robert, given
her continued conservatorship, thus allowing him to die from bacterial
pneumonia. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 157 (noting that Rose had been retained as
conservator and that her authority to remove life sustaining medical treatment
was restrained by the lower court in regard to withholding nutrition and
hydration, without mention of other life sustaining treatments). No mention is
made in any source, however, as to whether his pneumonia was viral or
bacterial or whether he received antibiotics. Requests by the author for
references to public sources for such information from attorneys in this case
went unanswered.
129
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 158.
130
Id. at 151 n.1.
131
Id. at 174. The court held that a conservator must prove, “by clear and
convincing evidence, either that the conservatee wished to refuse lifesustaining treatment or that to withhold such treatment would have been in his
best interest.” Id.
132
Id. at 175.
127
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Throughout its decision, the court repeatedly characterized the
issue as the intentional killing of the patient against his will.133
This emphasis illustrates the court’s disregard for the United
States Supreme Court’s explicit distinction between killing and
allowing the patient to die.134 Instead of framing the issue as a
conflict between the fundamental interest in refusing medical
treatment versus a fundamental interest in life, with the state’s
interest in protecting the individual’s choice as operating on both
sides of the conflict, the court pitted the decision to withdraw
treatment against the state’s interest in preserving life.135
After reviewing constitutional and common law issues,
starting with the principle that a competent person may refuse
even life-sustaining treatment,136 the court noted that California’s
Constitution also protects against “obvious invasions of . . .
133

Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, passim. For example, the court uses such
language as: “a conservator’s proposal to end the life of a conscious
conservatee,” id. at 156; “the conservator has claimed the authority to end the
conservatee’s life,” id. at 158; “the statute would be understood as authorizing
a conservator to deliberately end the life of a conservatee,” id. at 163;
“conservators . . . contemplating a conscious conservatee’s death,” id. at 166;
“permitting a conservator deliberately to end the life of a conscious
conservatee,” id. at 167; “[t]he ultimate decision is whether a conservatee
lives or dies,” id. at 169; “where a conservator proposes to end the life of a
conscious but incompetent conservatee,” id. at 174; “[t]he result would be to
permit a conservator freely to end a conservatee’s life,” id.; and “medical
decisions . . . intended to bring about the death of a conscious conservatee,”
id. at 175; see also Glenn Griener, Stopping Futile Treatment and the Slide
Toward Non-Voluntary Euthanasia, 2 HEALTH L.J. 67 (1994) (arguing that
courts use the same rationale for setting high evidentiary standards for
withholding of treatment as they do for maintaining the prohibition against
assisted suicide; i.e., to protect vulnerable persons); Adam J. Hildebrand,
Masked Intentions: The Masquerade of Killing Thoughts Used to Justify
Dehydrating and Starving People in a “Persistent Vegetative State” and
People with Other Profound Neurological Impairments, 16 ISSUES L. & MED.
143 (2000) (arguing that all decisions to withdraw nutrition and hydration are
based on the intention to kill).
134
See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). None of the Wendland
courts cited Vacco. See 28 P.3d 151; 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 550 (Ct. App 2000);
Wendland v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Ct. App. 1996).
135
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160, 163.
136
Id. at 158.
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interests fundamental to personal autonomy.”137 Following this,
the court concluded that the decision of a competent adult to
refuse
life-sustaining
treatment
must
be
considered
138
fundamental. Furthermore, the court noted that federal law
does not oppose a competent adult’s refusal of medical
treatment.139 Applying Cruzan,140 the California court inferred a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment, including the refusal of artificial nutrition and
hydration.141 Consequently, the right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment may only be infringed if the state’s interest in
preserving life outweighs the interest of the individual.142
Accepting that the right of a competent adult to refuse
medical treatment would survive that adult’s incapacity, the court
limited that survival to instances where it is “exercised while
competent pursuant to a law giving that act lasting validity.”143
Comparing California’s former Natural Death Act with its new
HCDA, the court concluded that the new law “give[s] effect to
the decision of a competent person, in the form either of
instructions for health care or the designation of an agent or
surrogate for health care decisions.”144
The court, however, distinguished decisions made through an
advance directive from those made by court-appointed
conservators.145 Agreeing with the appellate court that the
137

Id. at 159 (quoting Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d
633 (Cal. 1994)).
138
Id.
139
Id. at 159-60.
140
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
141
Id. at 159; see supra Part I.B (discussing Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261).
142
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160.
143
Id. But see infra note 241 (arguing that the court confused the issue of
the survival of the right with the issue of the sufficiency of the means utilized
to prove the patient’s prior wishes).
144
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 161. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
7185-7188, repealed by 1999 Cal. Stat. 658 (enacting the HCDA). The
HCDA is California’s version of the UHCDA. 1999 Cal. Stat. 658 (codified
as CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4600-4805 ).
145
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 162. But see Health Care Decisions Act:
Hearing on A.B. 891 Before the Assembly, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999)
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exercise of a right through another is a “legal fiction,” the court
reviewed the alternative basis for treatment choices for
incompetent patients offered by the Court of Appeal.146 That is,
while most courts accept the idea that a patient’s right to choose
or refuse medical treatment survives incompetence, what actually
survives is the patient’s right to have appropriate medical
decisions made for him by others in his own best interests.147
Wendland took issue with this position, reasoning that any
decision should reflect the conservatee’s own interests and
values, that treatment refusal by a court-appointed conservator is
not the equivalent of a conservatee’s refusal, and that any
decision by a conservator does not necessarily take precedence
over the conservatee’s right to life or the state’s interest in
preserving life.148
[hereinafter Assembly Hearing on A.B. 891] (concurring in Senate
Amendments and describing one of the purposes of the Act as “establish[ing] a
uniform standard of decision-making for adults without decision-making
capacity so that the same rules apply whether the decisionmaker is an agent
under a PAHC [power of attorney for health care], another surrogate
appointed by the patient, a conservator or a court”). Here, the court closely
examined the Court of Appeal’s decision in Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct.
App. 1988) (authorizing removal of a nasogastric feeding tube from a patient
who was not terminally ill but who was in PVS) stating that the court had
confused the two concepts. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 161. The court examined In
re Drabick closely because the decision had played a prominent role in both
the Wendland parties’ arguments and the revision of California Probate Code
section 2355, the statute governing Wendland. Id. The Court of Appeal
viewed Drabick as a conflict between the right of the conservatee to life and
his right to terminate unwanted treatment, and that the choice of those rights
was to be vicariously exercised through the conservator. Id. at 162. Advance
directives are statements, either oral or in writing, in which an individual
expresses his wishes in advance as to what kinds of treatments he would or
would not like to receive and the circumstances in which he wants those
wishes honored. Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaptation of Miranda to
Advance Directives: A Critique of the Implementation of the Patient SelfDetermination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 149 (1999). See infra Part III.B
(discussing advance directives).
146
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 162-63.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 163. In essence, without so stating, the court rejected the “best
interests” standard. See infra note 232 and accompanying text. The court then
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The court next turned its attention to California Probate Code
section 2355 and noted that the Law Review Commission
explicitly incorporated some of Drabick’s construction of the
former statute into the new statute.149 It compared the language of
the former section 2355 with the new language of amended
section 2355.150 The court construed the new language as making
informally expressed wishes dispositive rather than merely a
factor to be considered.151 Accepting that the revised section 2355
could be construed as allowing a competent person to use an
advance directive to direct all aspects of his or her future health
care, not just the withdrawal of life support when the patient is
terminally-ill, the court additionally determined that such wishes
would be a constitutional basis for withdrawal or withholding of
treatment since they would be based on the patient’s own
wishes.152
Nonetheless, the court contrasted decisions made based on
statements in an advance directive with decisions made by a
conservator, since the conservator is not appointed by the
conservatee and cannot be presumed to have special knowledge
of the conservatee’s wishes.153 The court briefly noted that the
pointed out that while no subsequent decision has rejected Drabick’s
reasoning, neither had any court extended that reasoning to any conservatee
who was not in PVS, and Drabick itself limited its decision to patients “for
whom there is no reasonable hope of a return to cognitive life.” Id. (quoting
Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 861 n.36 (Ct. App. 1988)). But see In re Grant,
747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987) cited in In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550,
566 (Ct. App. 2000), a case in which the court allowed the withdrawal of
artificial nutrition and hydration from a patient who had never been competent
and who was not comatose or in PVS but who was terminally ill.
149
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 163. The court characterized Drabick’s
conclusion as holding that “incompetent persons have a right . . . to
appropriate medical decisions that reflect their own interests and values.” Id.
150
Id. at 164. See supra note 83 (quoting the former and amended
versions of section 2355).
151
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 165. Drabick utilized the latter approach, using
informally expressed wishes as merely a factor for consideration. 245 Cal.
Rptr. 840, 857 (1988).
152
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160, 168.
153
Id.
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law gives preference to spouses and other relations who might
have knowledge of the person’s wishes but focused on the fact
that not all conservators have knowledge of those wishes.154
Regarding the standard of proof, the court agreed that the default
standard in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence, the
same standard cited by the Law Review Commission’s
explanatory comments.155 The court, however, found such
comments merely persuasive, as opposed to determinative,
evidence of the intent of the legislature.156
Whereas the United States Supreme Court held only that it
was constitutionally permissible under the United States
Constitution for a state to require clear and convincing evidence
of an incompetent’s wishes,157 the California Supreme Court leapt
forward and said that it would be unconstitutional under the
California Constitution not to require clear and convincing
evidence in the case of a minimally conscious patient.158 The
154

Id. By doing so, the court dismissed the stated intent of the legislature
in the HCDA to set a uniform standard for decisions by all surrogates,
regardless of the means by which they came to be the decision makers.
Assembly Hearing on A.B. 891, supra note 145, at Summary § 5.
155
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 166, 169.
156
Id. The court based its dismissal of such intent on lack of evidence that
the legislature had read every statement in its 280 page report. Id. at 166. But,
the explanatory comments merely pointed out that the standard is always the
preponderance of the evidence in the absence of specification otherwise; the
court does not explain why the legislature would not have known that and
would have assumed instead that the clear and convincing standard would
apply. See generally id.
157
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
158
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 170. The court resisted Florence’s argument that
section 2355 was unconstitutional on its face if read to permit a conservator to
“end the life” of a conscious conservatee using only the low preponderance of
the evidence standard. Id. at 166. Florence’s argument was based on Article I,
Section 1 of the California Constitution. See generally id. Instead, the court
construed the statute as requiring clear and convincing evidence to “minimize
the possibility of its unconstitutional application” and supported the clear and
convincing standard when necessary to protect important rights. Id. The court
explained that its construction “does not entail a deviation from the language
of the statute.” Id. While the language of the statute remains intact, however,
the court has made the best interests standard impossible to apply. See infra
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court rejected Rose’s argument that her decision did not entail
state action and, therefore, did not implicate any constitutional
rights.159 Noting that the state constitutional right of privacy
protects against private conduct, the court compared decisions to
withdraw life support with issues such as homicide, mercy
killing, assisted suicide and euthanasia.160 Furthermore, the court
stated that the issue involved was whether a conservatee lives or
dies, and the risk involved is that the conservatee would be
subjected to starvation, dehydration and death against the
conservatee’s wishes, the consequences of which a conscious
conservatee would perceive.161
Part III.C.2 (discussing this issue). The court stated that it had previously
found that such important rights included the right to reproduce, parental
rights, the discipline of judges, the appointment of a conservator to provide for
a person’s personal needs and involuntary electroconvulsive therapy.
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 169. Additionally, the court listed fundamental liberty
interests recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, which requires a clear and
convincing standard for termination of parental rights, commitment to a
mental hospital and deportation. Id. According to the court, the standard to be
used depends on the “gravity of the consequences that would result from an
erroneous determination of the issue involved.” Id. (quoting Weiner v.
Fleischman, 816 P.2d 892, 898 (Cal. 1991)).
159
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 165 n.10.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 169. While the court accepted the possibility that a conservatee
might perceive unwanted efforts to keep him alive as an “unwanted intrusion,”
it distinguished the two problems by stating that the decision to treat was
reversible, but the decision to withdraw is not. Id. at 169-70. Technically, this
is not true in the case of withdrawal of nutrition and hydration since death
would not immediately follow; however, there would most likely be a narrow
window in which to reverse the decision. In addition, while the decision to
treat is reversible, the unwanted treatment received before treatment
termination could not be reversed. See Nelson & Cranford, supra note 113, at
446-49. The court supported its position with a review of cases from other
states that are consistent with its opinion, including In re Martin, 538 N.W. 2d
399 (Mich. 1995) (requiring the clear and convincing evidence standard for
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from a minimally conscious
patient); see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing the case),
and Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209; see supra Part I.B (discussing the case).
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 170-172. The court also noted that Wisconsin has
refused to extend its earlier decisions giving conservators of patients in PVS
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After addressing the “primary” substituted judgment standard
in section 2355, the court turned to the alternative “best interest”
standard.162 This standard requires that a decision be made “in
accordance with the conservator’s determination of the
conservatee’s best interest . . . consider[ing] the conservatee’s
personal values to the extent known to the conservator.”163 The
decision must be made in good faith based on medical advice.164
Rose argued that the trial court had applied too high a standard of
proof, in that section 2355 gave the court the power only to
verify that she has made a good faith decision based on medical
advice and in consideration of the conservatee’s personal
values.165 The court rejected that argument.166
In its holding and throughout the decision, the court was
careful to refer to the issue as that of decisions by conservators to
refuse life-sustaining treatment for conservatees.167 Given the
court’s attention to the issue of whether court-appointed
conservators could be assumed to have special knowledge of the
personal beliefs and values of the conservators, one could
conceivably interpret Wendland as applying only to conservators
and not to other surrogates’ decisions.168 This interpretation is
the power, as a matter of law, to withhold life-sustaining treatments.
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 171 (discussing In Re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485
(Wis. 1997) (finding that a woman with Alzheimer’s dementia, who had
previously stated she would rather die from cancer than lose her mind, had not
made a sufficiently clear statement of a desire to refuse treatment)). But, the
Wendland court acknowledged that the Wisconsin court had only required a
preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. But see Kathleen M. Boozang, An
Intimate Passing: Restoring the Role of Family and Religion in Dying, 58 U.
PITT. L. REV. 549, 577-78 (1997) (noting other courts that have rejected or
altered the clear and convincing standard for medical decisions).
162
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 173-74.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 174.
166
Id. The court rejected Rose’s position despite her recitation of the
language of the section and the Law Revision Commission commentary
supporting her position. Id.
167
Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 passim.
168
Id. Other surrogates could be those family members making medical
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unlikely to be accurate, however; while the court specified that
the decision applied only to “conscious conservatees who have
not left formal directions for health care and whose conservators
propose to withhold life-sustaining treatment for the purpose of
causing their conservatees’ deaths,” the court then proceeded to
list those who would not be affected.169 The list failed to include
patients with nonappointed surrogates.170 The list also failed to
include the terminally ill.171 Given the above and the rarity of
patients’ use of advance directives and oral appointment of
surrogates, Wendland will reach a vast number of medical
decisions and will have a profound effect on health care decisions
in California.172
III. THESIS
There are four problematic issues with the court’s decision.
First, the Wendland court underestimated the sweeping effects of
its decision, which will affect a much greater number of patients
decisions for the patient without formal appointment. See CAL. PROB. CODE §
4714 (Deering 2001) (providing standards for surrogate decision makers,
including those “acting as a surrogate”); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4716 (Deering
2001) (allowing domestic partners the “same authority as a spouse . . . to
make a health care decision for his or her incapacitated spouse”).
169
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 175.
Our conclusion does not affect permanently unconscious patients,
including those who are comatose or [in PVS] . . . , persons who
have left legally cognizable instructions for health care . . . , persons
who have designated agents or other surrogates for health care . . . ,
or conservatees for whom conservators have made medical decisions
other than those intended to bring about the death of a conscious
conservatee.
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
See discussion infra Part III (arguing that the combination of a greater
number of affected patients than the Wendland court apparently realized, the
rarity of advance provisions by patients for health care decisions and the
contrast between the Wendland standard and the understanding of most
patients will lead to a major change in the way health care decisions are made
in California).
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than the court acknowledged.173 Second, the court’s reliance on
patient-provided directives to afford incompetent patients the care
they would have chosen for themselves was misplaced.174 Third,
the court’s understanding of the means by which patient
autonomy is promoted is extraordinarily limited.175 Fourth, as a
result of the court’s incorrect balancing of the interests involved,
the court erroneously concluded that protecting patients’ interests
requires application of the clear and convincing evidence
standard.176
The result of Wendland is that family members in California
are proscribed from making many decisions for their loved ones
when those loved ones did not have the requisite foresight or
knowledge to appoint them as surrogates.177 Wendland essentially
173

See infra Part III.A (arguing that the court misperceived the frequency
of the need for decisions for life-sustaining treatment for patients in a
minimally conscious state).
174
See infra Part III.B (noting the rarity of the execution of advance
directives and appointment of surrogates).
175
See infra Part III.C. Studies have shown that most people in this
country prefer to have their families make medical decisions for them when
they are incapacitated. The Wendland court, however, intervened and removed
the decision making ability from the family out of the contradictory fear that
the decision is not what the patient would have wanted. See generally
Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. In doing so, the court failed to recognize its own
conflict of interest. That is, the standard the court applies in the instant case
must be designed to protect future patients, even if that results in a decision in
the instant case that may not have been what the patient wanted.
176
See infra Part III.D (arguing that the clear and convincing standard is
not constitutionally required). See also Marybeth Herald, Until Life Support
Do Us Part: A Spouse’s Limited Ability to Terminate Life Support for an
Incompetent Spouse with No Hope of Recovery, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
207, 212 (2002) (arguing that Wendland “places a nearly insurmountable
burden of proof on the conservator of a person in a minimally conscious state”
and that “[t]he [c]ourt’s decision makes it virtually impossible to stop feeding
and hydration when the family member has not made any written advance
directive”).
177
Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. In addition to the insufficiency of the means
on which the court relied to mitigate the adverse effects of the court’s
decision, there are other unintended effects that the court appears not to have
anticipated. For example, a person appointed as conservator by the patient but
who has only a professional relationship with the patient and/or who is a
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coerces patients to exercise their autonomy, a contradictory
concept.178
To protect the rights of patients, the California legislature
must now amend the HCDA. The amendments should clearly
state that those closest to the patient are the appropriate decision
makers, absent evidence to the contrary. In addition, the
amendments must specify the procedural safeguards to be used,
and must clearly identify “preponderance of the evidence” as the
desired standard for decisions made in the face of such
relative stranger to him, would be free under the court’s interpretation to
withdraw or withhold treatment with little to no beneficial knowledge of the
patient’s wishes or values. See id. Yet, ironically, family members with an
intimate understanding of the patient would still be subject to the clear and
convincing standard. See id. Lastly, the opinion’s reliance on the distinction
between unconscious patients and those who are minimally conscious leaves
the door open to terminate treatment while the patient is comatose. See id. at
175. A surrogate’s hesitation—most likely in hopes that the patient will
awaken to a life of greater functioning—thus leads to the inability to honor a
patient’s wishes once the surrogate becomes convinced it is time to do so. The
unspoken, and likely unintended, message the court has thus sent to surrogates
is that they should discontinue support for their unconscious family members
as soon as a claim for “permanent” unconsciousness can be made, rather than
risk them waking into what they believe the patient would consider to be an
unacceptable state. In hindsight, Robert’s coma was not permanent; however,
it is doubtful that a claim of permanent unconsciousness that was made after
more than a full year would have been challenged. See id. at 154. The court’s
opinion glossed over the fact that Rose had authorized treatment for Robert
during the period in which he was not conscious. Id. In the California
Supreme Court’s recitation of the facts, it referred to Robert’s coma as lasting
only “several months.” Id. According to the appellate court, however, Robert
was in a coma for sixteen months. In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 550, 554
(Ct. App. 2000).
178
Autonomy is the voluntary exercise of a personal choice. BEAUCHAMP
& CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 58. The choice of most adults is to have their
family make whatever medical decisions they deem necessary on their behalf
in the event of incapacity. See infra Part III.C.2. In addition, most adults resist
executing advance directives. See infra Part III.C.2. Wendland severely
restricts the choices available to decision makers that have not been appointed
by the patient. See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. In order to avoid such
restriction under Wendland, potential patients will be forced to appoint a
surrogate or execute an advance directive; as a result, the voluntary aspect of
the choice is missing, and the choice is, therefore, coerced.

BUCKLEYMACRO1-20.DOC

288

4/1/03 2:43 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

safeguards.
A. Applicability of Wendland
Despite the court’s assurances that its decision affects only a
“narrow class of persons” and not “the vast majority of health
care decisions,” Wendland will affect more individuals than the
court anticipated.179 Wendland will have a profound impact on
decisions for the terminally-ill, those suffering from dementia but
who are not considered terminally-ill, all adults who have never
been competent and all minors. Given the low rate of execution
of advance directives and the inability of many to utilize the
options of oral directives and appointment of surrogates, it is
reasonable to assume that surrogates other than those appointed
by the patient will make the majority of the decisions in these
cases and will be subject to Wendland’s constraints.180
Of the approximately six thousand deaths that occur daily in
the United States, it is estimated that approximately seventy
percent involve decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment.181
Many, if not the majority, of such cases involve terminally ill
patients for whom, therefore, a different legal standard might
logically apply.182 Still, there would remain a significant number
179

Wendland, 28 P.3d at 166. “[W]e see no constitutional reason to apply
the higher evidentiary standard to the majority of health care decisions made
by conservators not contemplating a conscious conservatee’s death.” Id.
180
See infra Part III.B (discussing the limited utilization of advance
directives and oral appointment of surrogates).
181
See Rebecca Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of
Incompetent Patients, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 614 (1994) (citing estimates
from the American Hospital Association, the President’s Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, and other authors). The percentage may be as high as seventy-five
percent. Steven Miles, Personal Dying and Medical Death, in BIRTH TO
DEATH: SCIENCE AND BIOETHICS 163, 167 (David C. Thomasma &
Thomasine Kushner eds., 1996)
182
Cantor, supra note 11, at 184. The purpose of a higher standard is to
avoid the risk of erroneous decisions. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 170. Terminally
ill patients will die in a short time whether treatment is withheld or not;
therefore, the risk of an erroneous decision is less and courts presumably
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of cases that would not involve terminally ill patients.183 For
example, patients with dementia often retain some level of
cognitive functioning before they are deemed terminally ill, yet
after questions of life-sustaining treatments arise.184 In addition,
given the rarity of PVS, it is reasonable to assume that the
majority of such decisions involve patients who are at least
minimally conscious.185 As a result, the “narrow class” that
Wendland affects in fact includes a significant number of
would be willing to utilize a lower standard. It is not clear, however, that the
court intended a different standard for those cases, since the court exempted
“permanently unconscious patients, including those who are comatose or in a
persistent vegetative state,” but did not exempt the terminally ill. Id. at 175.
183
See infra notes 184-85.
184
Dresser, supra note 181, at 614. Dementia may occur as a result of
chronic conditions such as chronic liver or renal disease, Parkinsons disease or
metabolic problems. NEUROLOGY FOR THE NON-NEUROLOGIST 233-41
(William J. Weiner & Christopher G. Goetz eds., 4th ed. 1999). Dementia as
a result of AIDS, cerebrovascular injury and Alzheimer’s disease affects an
increasing number of people, and the incidence is likely to increase with the
aging of the population and the increasing ability of medical technology to
prolong biologic life. See Dresser, supra note 181, at 614. The mean
incidence of moderate to severe dementia in persons over the age of sixty in
the U.S. has been calculated at 4.8 %. PRINCIPLES OF NEUROLOGY, supra note
46, at 1049. Alzheimer’s alone was the eighth leading cause of death in both
1998 and 1999, with 35,306 and 44,536 deaths per year, respectively. NAT’L
CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, 49 NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REPORT NO. 11 (2001) [hereinafter
NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REPORT], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nvsr/nvsr49/nvsr49_11.pdf. Alzheimer’s disease is progressively
debilitating, leading to the gradual loss of cognitive ability and diminishing
ability to care for one’s own needs, including feeding. PRINCIPLES OF
NEUROLOGY, supra note 46, at 1050-51; see also NEUROLOGY FOR THE NONNEUROLOGIST, supra, at 234-35. Decisions relating to the care of those in the
later stages of Alzheimer’s alone warrant concern over the applicability of the
court’s decision.
185
See Cranford, supra note 2, at 196. It is estimated that there are
approximately 15,000 to 35,000 patients in PVS in the United States. Id. Such
patients may linger for many years. Id. It is estimated that there are
approximately 2,190,000 deaths per year in the United States. Dresser, supra
note 181, at 614. Therefore, even if all PVS patients were suddenly to die in
the same year, it would still only represent .7 to .16 % of the deaths for that
year.
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individuals.
While the court’s holding specifically referred to conservators
and did not mention other surrogates, the reasoning of the court
indicates that its holding applies to all surrogates making
treatment refusals.186 In addition, minors, who are not legally
competent, and never-competent adults would always be subject
to the heightened standard of “best interests,” which the court
declined to define.187 As a result, such cases will be decided on
an individual basis, despite the legislature’s finding that courts
are the decision-makers of last resort.188
B. The Court’s Attempt to Mitigate the Decision’s Effect
Wendland’s reliance on patient-provided directives and
appointment of surrogates is unjustified.189 The Wendland court
186

Wendland, 28 P.3d at 175. The court rejected the argument that
genuine treatment desires would be frustrated, basing the rejection on the
availability of advance directives and oral appointment of surrogates; the court
appears to assume that all decisions will either be made by conservators or
surrogates appointed by the patient. Id. at 172. But see infra Part III.B
(explaining that few adults have appointed surrogates or made advance
directives).
187
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 174. “We need not in this case attempt to define
the extreme factual predicates that, if proved by clear and convincing
evidence, might support a conservator’s decision that withdrawing life support
would be in the best interests of a conscious conservatee.” Id.
188
CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650 (Deering 2001).
(b) Modern medical technology has made possible the artificial
prolongation of human life beyond natural limits. In the interest of
protecting individual autonomy, this prolongation of the process of
dying for a person for whom continued health care does not improve
the prognosis for recovery may violate patient dignity and cause
unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing nothing medically
necessary or beneficial to the person.
(c) In the absence of controversy, a court is normally not the proper
forum in which to make health care decisions, including decisions
regarding life-sustaining treatment.
Id. at § 4650(b)-(c).
189
See Wendland, 28 P.3d at 172. In order for such reliance to be
justified, there would have to be evidence that the vast majority of such
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focused heavily on written advance directives as a means for
competent individuals to plan for their care in the event they
become incapacitated.190 Advance directives, also known as
Living Wills, were proposed for just such purposes.191
Nevertheless, only ten to twenty-five percent of adults in the
United States have executed advance directives.192 Despite
legislative and academic support, aggressive programs to increase
their use have failed.193
decision are made for adults who were once competent, that competent adults
are aware that they are available, are aware of the importance of executing
them, are not resistant to executing them and do not assume that their families
will be able to make whatever choices seem appropriate to them. See infra
notes 192-95, 229-31 and accompanying text (arguing that such conditions do
not exist).
190
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160-61. The court discussed advance directives
extensively and dismissed the contention that a high evidentiary burden of
proof would “frustrate many genuine treatment desires,” based on the
availability of advance directives, including oral health care instructions. Id. at
172. But see Dresser, supra note 181, at 632 (noting the inevitable general
nature of the instructions in advance directives and the failure of even
aggressive programs to increase the use of advance directives). See also
Patricia D. White, Appointing a Proxy Under the Best of Circumstances, 1992
UTAH L. REV. 849 (1992). White argues that
a living will is a very crude instrument to use for making actual
medical decisions . . . . [A]ll it can express is what a competent
person thought she would want were she to become incompetent and
be in a situation generically like the one she turns out actually to be in
. . . . [I]t is a mistake to conceive of an advance directive as
expressing an incompetent patient’s autonomous choice in any
specific circumstance.
Id. at 857.
191
See Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1256.
192
Pope, supra note 145, at 154. Some studies show that the percentage
may be as low as five. See Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1270. Even health
care professionals tend not to complete advance directives. Id. at 1273. In
addition, African-American patients are more likely to fear that executing an
advance directive will adversely affect their care. Orentlicher, supra note 9, at
1276.
193
See, e.g., The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial
to Improve Care in Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to
Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments,
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Even when executed, advance directives often fail to provide
clear guidance; they are often vague and do not address the
specific circumstances of the patient.194 In any case, such
directives reflect only what the competent person thinks he may
want in a situation he is not then experiencing.195 In addition,
strict adherence to statements in advance directives may frustrate
the state’s interest in preserving life in cases where the family

274 JAMA 1591 (1995) (describing a study in which the interventions were
designed to improve communication between patients and physicians on endof-life decision making but which failed to improve the incidence or timing of
discussions relating to patient wishes for cardiopulmonary resuscitation); see
also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §
4206, 104 Stat. 1388, § 4206 (1990) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1991))
(including as a budget amendment the PSDA, encouraging the execution of
advance directives by requiring healthcare providers to provide information to
patients regarding advance directives); see generally Edward J. Larson &
Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Directives: A History and
Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
249 (1997) (discussing the PSDA).
194
Dresser, supra note 181, at 632 (stating that “[i]n most real cases, our
knowledge of the incompetent patient’s past is limited to fuzzy comments and
ambiguous behavior”); accord, Linda C. Fentiman, Privacy and Personhood
Revisited: A New Framework for Substitute Decisionmaking for the
Incompetent, Incurably Ill Adult, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 824 (1989)
(blaming in part “the pervasive use in the living will statutes of vague and
sometimes circular definitions of such crucial terms as ‘terminally ill,’
‘imminent death,’ [and] ‘artificial’ life sustaining treatment”); see also Cantor,
supra note 11, at 190 (describing “the imprecision or vagueness frequently
present in advance directives”).
195
See White, supra note 190, at 857 (describing any choice made in a
living will as “a choice which the patient has necessarily made on the basis of
incomplete information”); see also Susan Adler Channick, The Myth of
Autonomy at the End-of-Life: Questioning the Paradigm of Rights, 44 VILL. L.
REV. 577, 610 (1999) (arguing that “the potential for mistake or abuse is
compounded by the possibility that the advance directive no longer represents
the patient’s wishes”). Evidence suggests that even competent adults cannot
accurately predict what their wishes will be in a given situation until they
actually experience it. See Dresser, supra note 181, at 632 (noting that “even
the most carefully considered advance choices are not as informed as we
would like them to be, since typically the patient has never actually faced the
situation that eventually emerges”).
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believes the patient would have changed his mind.196 Courts
should rely on written advance directives only if competent adults
actually execute such documents, if the directives are
unambiguous and if individuals can both accurately predict what
type of care they would or would not want in the future and be
unlikely to change their minds.197
196

In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d
607, 613 (N.Y. 1988) (noting that “human beings are incapable of perfect
foresight”); accord Dresser, supra note 181, at 632 (discussing a “risk that
uninformed people will inadvertently issue directives that substantially threaten
their interests as incompetent persons”); White, supra note 190, at 857
(arguing that the problems inherent in advance directives make “it [ ] a
mistake to conceive of an advance directive as expressing an incompetent
patient’s autonomous choice in any specific circumstance”). Absolute reliance
on advance directives requires family members to withhold treatment based on
a loved one’s advance directives, despite their current belief that the condition
the patient is in is not as distasteful as the patient had anticipated. Dresser,
supra note 181, at 631 (arguing that “[e]ven when people exercise due
diligence and provide an explicit indication of their wishes, those who remain
still may be uncertain of what the patient ‘would want’ in treatment situations
that later materialize”). Written advance directives also allow patients to
appoint someone to make decisions for them; however, there is no guarantee
that the choices made by that appointee would be any more consistent with
what the patient would have wanted. THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON
LIFE AND THE LAW, NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, WHEN OTHERS
MUST CHOOSE: DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY 7 (1992)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE]. In fact, studies have shown that choices made by
surrogates often differ from those the patient would have made; however, in
most cases, the surrogates would have accepted the treatment while the patient
would have refused it. Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1279; see also Cantor,
supra note 11, at 189 (arguing that advance directives are most useful for
evidence of “well developed and enduring notions of dignity, religion, and
consideration for loved ones, which they want reflected in their future medical
handling”); TASK FORCE, supra, at 7.
197
But see Cantor, supra note 11, at 189 (noting that some commentators
“doubt the utility of advance directives” due to the need for a “declarant [to]
anticipate a multitude of possible medical scenarios” and “project how he or
she will feel in a variety of inherently unknowable incompetent mental
states”); Dresser, supra note 181 (arguing that competent persons’ statements
on death and dying are only “a piece of the puzzle, for their situations and
experiences are now vastly altered” and proposing a revised “best interests”
standard looking at their current experience more than what their predictions
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In addition to the limited utility of advance directives, the
high evidentiary burden set in Wendland frustrates the ability to
honor genuine treatment desires, particularly in the case of the
young and the poor.198 The court dismissed these concerns,
pointing out that the law allows for oral instructions and oral
appointment of surrogates.199 While oral appointment of
surrogates and oral instructions may mitigate the problem in
some cases, it is not clear that it will do so in a significant
percentage of cases. Since oral instructions and designations are
valid in California only during the course of treatment, illness or
health care institution stay in which the designation was made,
the court apparently assumed that the patient will be competent
when treatment is initiated and that either the patient or the
physician will initiate a conversation for the purpose of eliciting
such statements.200 To the contrary, studies show that neither
physicians nor patients do, in fact, initiate discussions about
patients’ wishes for future treatment, even when they are
seriously ill.201 Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that a
significant number of patients arrive at health care facilities
incompetent due to the severity of their illness or injury. Since
young people are more likely to be injured than to be taken ill,
for what their experience would be, in order to protect patients from
burdensome decisions either to treat or withhold treatment).
198
In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 172 (Cal. 2001) (citing an unnamed
Brief of Amici Curiae) (citation omitted).
199
Id. at 172.
200
See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. California law was further
amended in 2001 to limit the applicability of oral designation of surrogates to
“the course of treatment or illness or during the stay in the health care
institution when the surrogate designation is made, or for 60 days, whichever
period is shorter.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 4711(b) (Deering 2002) (emphasis
added to new provisions). As a result, the designation of a surrogate at the
beginning of what becomes a lengthy hospital stay may expire prior to the
patient, leaving the patient without a surrogate who can legally effectuate his
wishes for termination of treatment by the time the patient would most have
wanted his wishes to be followed.
201
Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1268-69 (citing studies showing that
physicians believe that they know what the patients want, but in fact matched
their patients wishes no better than chance would provide).
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they may be disproportionately affected by an inability to make
an oral instruction.202 Additionally, as a result of lack of health
insurance, the poor may be more likely to delay seeking health
care until they are past the point of being able to make decisions
for themselves.203 There is also evidence that nonwhite patients
are less likely to discuss treatment preferences with their
physicians.204
Given that written advance directives and oral appointment of
surrogates are not available to all patients, are not widely used
and are often ambiguous, these means of expressing choices are
unlikely to pass the Wendland court’s high standard of proof and
reliance on them as a means to protect patients from burdensome
treatments is misplaced.205 The result of the court’s interpretation
of advance directives is that patients will be forced to appoint
proxies or execute advance directives to avoid decisions they
would not necessarily approve later.206
202

See Fentiman, supra note 194, at 803 (noting that the young are less
likely to suffer from chronic disease and disability). Accidents were the fifth
leading cause of death in the U.S. in both 1998 and 1999, with 97,835 and
97,860 deaths per year, respectively. NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, supra
note 184.
203
SUSAN SHERWIN, NO LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS AND
HEALTH CARE 222 (1992).
204
Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1276 (noting that the studies showed that
the disparity persists even after correcting for income and education).
205
By definition, advance directives are executed by competent adults;
minors and developmentally disabled adults thus cannot make advance
directives. Cantor, supra note 11, at 189-90; see also Ardath A. Hamann,
Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement to Living Wills and Durable
Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REV. 103, 124 (1993).
206
See generally In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001). In addition,
the reliance on advance directives, even oral directives, to correct the potential
for providing unwanted care is not only unwarranted, it could also leave
Wendland’s interpretation of section 2355 open to attack on Equal Protection
grounds. In an Equal Protection Analysis, the court must utilize strict scrutiny
when assessing the validity of state intervention in decisions affecting suspect
classifications such as race or affecting fundamental rights. GERALD GUNTHER
& KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 630 (13th ed. 1991). Here, it
could be argued that the de facto requirement of Wendland that a competent
adult must complete an advance directive in order to avoid unwanted life-
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C. The Court’s Attempt to Honor Autonomy

The Wendland court based its reasoning on the need to honor
Robert’s autonomy.207 Throughout its opinion, however, the court
neglected to acknowledge that the exercise of autonomy involves
the choice between two fundamental rights directly opposed to
each other: the fundamental right to life and the fundamental
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.208 Instead, the court
focused on the state’s interest in preserving life as measured
against each of those choices.209 As a result, the court clearly
gave greater weight to the state’s interest, despite the apparent
equality of the individual’s conflicting rights. The court failed to
reconcile these rights.210
1. Basis for the Court’s Concern
The Wendland court’s emphasis on the need for stringent
protection of Robert’s right to life appears to have been based on
assumptions about the nature of the minimally conscious state and
the motives of those choosing to withdraw treatment in that

sustaining medical care when incompetent not only has a disparate impact on
minorities, since they are more resistant to completing such directives, but
additionally affects the fundamental right to privacy on which the Wendland
court based the right to refuse medical care. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 165 n.10.
207
See Wendland, 28 P.3d at 159, 168.
208
Id., passim. To avoid unconstitutional application of section 2355, the
court construed the statute to require proof by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at 166. But, the court had earlier accepted the notion that an individual also
has the fundamental right to refuse treatment and that such right would survive
incapacity “if exercised while competent pursuant to a law giving that act
lasting validity.” Id. at 160. The court specifically refused to equate the right
to refuse treatment with the “right to an appropriate decision by a courtappointed conservator.” Id. at 163.
209
Id. But see Hamann, supra note 205, at 141-46 (arguing that the
state’s interest in preserving life does not extend to personal decisions by an
individual regarding his own life).
210
See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. The court did note that neither
may be infringed unless clearly outweighed by the state’s interest. Id. at 160,
163.
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circumstance.211 The court appeared convinced that there is a
distinct, relevant difference between PVS and a minimally
conscious state and stated concern that “a person whose
permanent unconsciousness prevents him from perceiving that
artificial hydration and nutrition are being withdrawn arguably
has a more attenuated interest in avoiding that result than a
person who may consciously perceive the effects of dehydration
and starvation.”212 The potential that a minimally conscious
patient will perceive physical or psychological discomfort during
treatment, however, has led some to claim that a minimally
conscious patient has an even greater interest in having treatment
withheld.213 Moreover, some have argued that there is more
similarity than dissimilarity between PVS and a minimally
conscious state.214
The court also assumed that Robert’s statement that he
wouldn’t want to live “like a vegetable” meant that he was
referring specifically to PVS.215 Not only is there no evidence
that Robert understood the distinction or intended to limit his
request to PVS, but he specifically made statements that would
indicate otherwise.216 The court also distinguished Robert’s
211

See Hamann, supra note 205, at 138-59 (listing numerous assumptions
courts tend to make when deciding cases involving personal medical
decisions).
212
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 163.
213
See, e.g., Nelson & Cranford, supra note 113, at 447-48.
Additionally, it has been argued that any physical discomfort could be
alleviated. Id. Accord, Michelle M. Mello, Note, Death Life, and Uncertainty:
Allocating the Risk of Error in the Decision to Terminate Life, 109 YALE L.J.
635 (1999).
214
See, e.g., Nelson & Cranford, supra note 113, at 449 (arguing that the
two states are more alike than dissimilar, where both states offer little more
than biological existence, neither offers a reasonable chance of recovery, most
patients would desire release from that state, and both lead to the wish “not to
kill the patient but to let nature take its course by removing unwanted and
nonbeneficial treatment”).
215
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 157, 173.
216
Id. at 157. His daughter recalled Robert saying that “if he could not do
all the things that he enjoyed doing, just enjoying the outdoors, just basic
things, feeding himself, talking, communicating, if he could not do those
things, he would not want to live.” Id. Robert’s description is consistent with
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situation from that of the terminally-ill patient,217 yet at the same
time the court recognized the precarious health of those whom
the cases typically concern.218 In addition, the court appears to
have assumed that the motives of family members who request
treatment termination for their incompetent relatives are suspect
and the motives of family members who choose to treat are
not.219 The court, however, provided no support for any of its
a minimally conscious state and not as limited as PVS. See supra note 46 for a
description of patients in PVS.
217
Id. at 153.
218
Id. at 154 n.1. “[A]s this case demonstrates, these issues tend to evade
review because they typically concern persons whose health is seriously
impaired.” Id.
219
See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. Some commentators share the
court’s concern. See, e.g., Aaron N. Krupp, Health Care Surrogate Statutes:
Ethics Pitfalls Threaten the Interests of Incompetent Patients, 101 W. VA. L.
REV. 99 (1998). However, based on personal experience as a consultant on a
tertiary care hospital’s Ethics Consultation Service, the author believes this
assumption to be the opposite of the norm. While there are undoubtedly some
instances where family members are operating out of suspect motives in asking
to withdraw treatment, the more common scenario in the author’s experience
is that it is the estranged family member and the one with the strained
relationship with the patient who is most likely to resist termination of
treatment. While the author is not aware of any studies specifically looking at
this issue, there are cases in the literature where the decision maker may have
insisted on continuing treatment as a result of a strained relationship. See,
e.g., “Code Him ‘Til He’s Brain Dead!,” in INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL
ETHICS 169-70 (John C. Fletcher et al. eds., 1995) (hereinafter CLINICAL
ETHICS) (describing a case in which the estranged daughters of an abusive
alcoholic insisted on providing aggressive treatment for their father despite his
physicians’ recommendations to the contrary). One commentator argues that
there has not been one case in which it has been shown that the family was
“motivated by financial considerations,” despite courts’ frequent mention of
this potential problem. Hamann, supra note 205, at 152. In addition, family
members could simply “walk away” if they wish to avoid financial or
emotional burdens of caring for the patient. Id. at 153. In contrast to the
courts’ concern, studies have shown that family members are less likely to
discontinue treatment for another than they would be for themselves. Id. at
152. In the Wendland case, it was Robert’s estranged mother and sister who
opposed treatment termination; neither had visited Robert’s home for ten
years, neither acknowledged or celebrated birthdays or holidays with him, and
Robert had refused to attend his sister’s wedding. Nelson & Cranford, supra
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assumptions.220
2. The Court’s Application of the Concept of Autonomy
The Wendland court concluded that the guiding principle
underlying the changes to section 2355 was a respect for personal
autonomy.221 The court’s decision, however, has the anomalous
effect of limiting that autonomy. The court struggled with
somewhat competing goals: to respect and protect Robert’s
autonomy by ensuring that any decisions made for him are made
based on his own wishes, not for the benefit of others,222 and to
protect future, similarly situated individuals.223 These goals are
fundamentally at odds inasmuch as it is difficult, at best, to honor
the idiosyncratic choices of one individual while simultaneously
striving to achieve consistent results in future cases of other
idiosyncratic individuals.224 Similarly, it is contradictory to claim
that an individual requires protection from choices made for the
benefit of others and simultaneously apply a next-to-impossible
standard to the instant case in order to protect future
individuals.225 Such a standard may be a reflection of the court’s
note 113, at 435. While the psychological implications of decisions to
withdraw treatment are beyond the scope of this article, there appears to be at
least enough of a question on the issue to reject the presumption that treatment
termination decisions are more suspect than treatment continuation decisions.
220
See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151.
221
Id. at 168 (noting that the “only apparent purpose of requiring
conservators to make decisions in accordance with the conservatee’s wishes,
when those wishes are known, is to enforce the fundamental principle of
personal autonomy”).
222
Id. at 172. Granted, this is a legal fiction since Robert had already
died at the time of the decision; however, the same argument could be made
for each case decided under the court’s standard. See id. at 158.
223
JANE C. GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS at 1 (1996).
224
See White, supra note 190, at 860 (arguing that “a presumption in
favor of a specified family decision maker would at least allow for the
possibility that different decisions would be made for different patients, and
thus acknowledge the fact that people’s preferences, as expressed when they
are competent, differ.”)
225
See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151.
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own worldview and desire for a particular outcome rather than
those of the patient.226
Autonomy, according to the court, is exercised only through
specific statements of a competent adult.227 This is unnecessarily
strict. Autonomy may be equally exercised by delegating one’s
choices to another.228 For example, studies indicate that most
patients trust their family members to make decisions for them.229
Additionally, many patients prefer to have surrogates determine
the patient’s best interests rather than decide on the basis of the
surrogate’s view of the patient’s preferences.230 After Wendland,
226

Id. at 170 (referring to providing care against the patient’s wishes as
the “less perilous result” when compared to withdrawing treatment). See
Boozang, supra note 161 (arguing that courts have taken either a “vitalist”
stance, favoring life above all other considerations, or a “qualitist” stance,
considering quality of life issues in the determination of best interests); see
also Matthew S. Ferguson, Note, Ethical Postures of Futility and California’s
Uniform Health Care Decisions Act, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1244 (2002)
(arguing that the Wendland court was interested “in the results, rather than the
process of patient decisionmaking” and “focused on the ends, not means”).
The court is not alone in viewing the case with an eye toward future patients;
eight amicus briefs were filed on behalf of Rose and Robert and thirteen
amicus briefs were filed on behalf of Florence. See Wendland, 28 P.3d 151.
But see Hamann, supra note 205, at 165-66 (arguing that “strangers with
political agenda[s]” should not be allowed to intervene in cases involving
personal medical decisions since such groups “do not see the patient as a
person but as a symbol of a cause”).
227
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 172 (noting that requiring clear statements is for
the purpose of effectuating the patient’s right to refuse).
228
See Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1280 (arguing that “[t]he important
point is that the patient has decided how the decision will be made”). Such
delegation need not be formal, as with legal appointment by adults of
surrogates. Id.
229
TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 6-7. One survey showed that eightyfive percent of those polled believed that the family and the patient’s
physicians should make end-of-life treatment decisions for incapacitated
patients. Id. at 6 n.2 (citing a Time Magazine/CNN poll conducted in October
of 1989).
230
Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1280 nn.156-57 (noting various studies
showing that greater than ninety percent of those surveyed preferred to have
family members serve as surrogates, and that greater than fifty percent favored
the best interests standard over the substituted judgment standard). Studies
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however, failure to name a health care proxy must be interpreted
as an indication that decisions by family members would be
unwelcome.231 This interpretation fails to honor the autonomous
wishes of the majority to have their families choose for them.
The anomalous result of Wendland is that the very changes to
section 2355 that embodied the principle of respect for autonomy
have been eliminated. In effect, the court rejected the best
interest standard of section 2355 by requiring a standard of proof
that cannot be met in any case in which section 2355 would
apply.232 By requiring clear and convincing evidence and ignoring
the amended statute’s attempt to increase the use of the
conservatee’s wishes and values in decisions when his wishes in
the instant situation are unclear, the court clearly favored the
right to life over the right to refuse treatment.233 In effect, this
have also shown that most patients would want family members to have at
least “a little leeway” to override their directives if necessary to protect their
future interests. Dresser, supra note 181, at 631 (citing a study of dialysis
patients, in which “sixty-one percent wanted surrogates to have ‘a little
leeway’ to override the directives if necessary to protect their future best
interests, while thirty-one percent wanted surrogates to have ‘complete
leeway’”). Such future interests could include the interest in preserving life
when the individual actually enjoys a quality of life greater than what he had
anticipated. Id. at 624 (citing the hypothetical example of a musician who
executed an advance directive requiring discontinuance of treatment in the
event of incapacity and inability to experience music but who later appears to
be enjoying her life in the face of senile dementia and a curable illness; citing
also the opposite hypothetical of a person who had directed that all efforts be
expended to prolong her life but who subsequently suffers “unremitting,
unremediable pain and distress,” while incompetent, toward the end of her
terminal illness).
231
See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d at 174. The court rejected subjective
proof of Robert’s best interest, despite the fact that the best interest standard is
only applied when there is no objective proof of the patient’s wishes. Id.
(stating that Rose had “no basis for such a finding other than her own
subjective judgment that the conservatee did not enjoy a satisfactory quality of
life and legally insufficient evidence to the effect that he would have wished to
die”).
232
Id. at 172. In effect, the court reset the standard to the degree of the
old section 2355 prior to In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988),
only without any best interest standard at all.
233
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 174 (noting that the decision “threatens the
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favors the state’s interests in preserving life over the individual’s
interests to choose between life and forgoing treatment. As such,
the court’s decision fails to honor the autonomy it admits the
statute sought to enhance.234
D. The Court Erred as to the Appropriate Standard of Proof
There are various approaches to the issue of safeguards for
decision making for incompetent patients. Such approaches
include different standards of proof,235 family health care
decisions acts236 and alternative ways to view the needs of
incompetent patients.237 These approaches share with Wendland
the common element of indirectly addressing issues related to a
due process analysis: the rights and interests of the individuals,
the interests of the state and procedural safeguards.238
Despite language relating to individual rights balanced against
the state’s interest, Wendland never fully addresses the issue of
conservatee’s fundamental rights to privacy and life”).
234
Id. at 161, 168.
235
Id. at 169-70 (discussing the use of the clear and convincing evidence
standard when fundamental rights are implicated).
236
See, e.g., Hamann, supra note 205 (arguing that families had always
been the locus of medical decisions for incompetent patients until the advent of
medical technology, and that returning the decisions to families is
appropriate). See also A.B. A6315, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003)
(proposing the Family Healthcare Decisions Act), at http://www.assembly.
state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A06315&sh=t.
237
See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 181, at 627-30 (arguing that competent
persons do not have a right to make advance choices that lead to serious
harms); see also Nelson & Cranford, supra note 113, at 447-48 (arguing that,
contrary to the opinions judges tend to hold that patients in PVS have a greater
interest in having treatment withdrawn than those who are minimally
conscious, patients in the minimally conscious state have a greater need to
avoid the pain and humiliation of continued treatment because they may be
able to perceive such problems).
238
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For state interests in
cases involving withdrawal of medical care, see In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445
(finding four state interests that might weigh against termination of treatment:
preservation of life, protection of “innocent third parties,” suicide prevention,
and maintaining the integrity of the medical profession).
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due process.239 Instead, the court implicitly stated that due
process in the case of a fundamental right to life requires a higher
standard of proof than is normally required for civil matters as a
safeguard against erroneous deprivation of a fundamental right.240
The disadvantage of this approach in the case of refusal of
medical care for incompetent patients is that avoiding the risk of
violating the fundamental right to life creates an equal risk of
violating the fundamental right to refuse medical care.241 In such
cases, the risk of error will always be borne by the patient. As
such, this issue is different from many other due process
situations, where the purpose of higher standards of proof and
increased procedural safeguards is to transfer the risk of error

239

Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160.
Id. at 169.
The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the fact finder
concerning the degree of confidence our society deems necessary in
the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication, to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to
indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.
Id. (emphasis added). While the court mentions the allocation of the risk
between the litigants, it assumed that the litigants here are the state and the
conservator rather than the conflicting rights of the patient and concentrated
instead on the relative importance it attached to the ultimate decision. Id.
241
Id. at 160. See In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988)
(noting that the state’s interest is in protecting the patient’s right to have
appropriate decisions made on his behalf and further noting that “[t]he
problem is not to preserve life under all circumstances but to make the right
decisions. A conclusive presumption in favor of continuing treatment
impermissibly burdens a person’s right to make the other choice”). According
to Wendland, the right to refuse medical treatment survives incapacity only “if
exercised while competent pursuant to a law giving that act lasting validity.”
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160. In that determination, the court confused the
survival of the right with procedural safeguards to determine the validity of the
choice made in exercising the right. The court, in essence, converted advance
directives into a new form of statute of frauds with a choice to receive all
medical treatment as the default in the absence of compelling evidence (usually
written) to overcome the default. Id. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (7th
ed. 1999) (defining “statute of frauds” as a statute “designed to prevent fraud
and perjury by requiring certain contracts to be in writing and signed by the
party to be charged”).
240
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from the individual to the state.242
The preponderance of the evidence standard, on the other
hand, results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error
between litigants.243 Such a standard creates a “fair balance”
between conflicting interests.244 Other standards, by design, favor
the interests of one side.245 Preponderance of the evidence is the
standard applied “most frequently in litigation between private
parties in every State.”246 The preponderance of the evidence may
be considered insufficient if the majority of jurisdictions have
adopted a stricter burden of proof.247 Higher standards of proof
may be required when the competing interests are those of an
individual and the state.248 The Supreme Court, however,
recognizes a distinction between those proceedings and those in
242

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755, 760 (1982) (refusing to apply
the preponderance of the evidence standard for fact findings in proceedings to
terminate parental rights, since the interests of the parents and the child are not
in conflict with each other prior to a finding of parental neglect but are instead
in conflict with the interests of the state).
243
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) (applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard in Chapter 11 reorganization
proceedings in order to balance the conflicting interests of the creditor in
recovering full payment and the debtor’s interest in a fresh start).
244
Id. at 287.
245
Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (noting
that other standards “express[] a preference for one side’s interests” and
applying the preponderance of the evidence standard in a class action suit
seeking recovery for violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, in order to balance defendants’ risk of “opprobrium that may result from
a finding of fraudulent conduct” with the plaintiff’s risk of inability to recover
under the act).
246
Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 577 (1987) (applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard in paternity proceedings in order to
balance the conflicting rights of the individuals involved, as distinct from
balancing the rights of an individual against the interests of the state).
247
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (noting that adherence
to a standard by the majority of jurisdictions reflects “a profound judgment
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered”).
California, however, is one of only five states to require clear and convincing
evidence in treatment termination decisions for incompetent patients. See
supra Part I.B.
248
Minnich, 483 U.S at 581.
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which risks of an adverse ruling for private individuals exist
regardless of the ultimate outcome of the case.249 In such cases,
the “equipoise of the private interests that are at stake . . .
supports the conclusion that the standard of proof normally
applied in private litigation is also appropriate for these cases.”250
Standards of proof are designed to protect against the risk of
error in the majority of cases, rather than the “rare
exceptions.”251 In addition, practical considerations may affect
the choice of a constitutionally based burden of proof.252 That is,
imposing a burden that cannot be met erects an “unreasonable
barrier,”253 and it may be appropriate to use lower standards of
proof when evidentiary problems could arise using a higher
standard.254 In addition, “professional review” is sufficient to
mitigate risks created by lower standards of proof.255
In Wendland, Rose’s decision to withdraw nutrition and
249

Id.
Id.
251
See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (stating that
“procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the
truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare
exceptions”); supra note 219 (arguing that there is no reason to assume that a
family member seeking to terminate medical treatment for an incompetent
relative is doing so out of inappropriate motives).
252
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979) (allowing a lower
standard of proof for civil commitment of minors since “[p]sychiatric
diagnosis . . . is to a large extent based on medical ‘impressions’ drawn from
subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the diagnostician”).
253
Id. at 432.
254
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (refusing to require
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt in parental rights termination proceedings
because of evidentiary problems); see also Addington, 441 U.S. 427-31
(refusing to require evidence beyond a reasonable doubt in civil commitment
proceedings because of a question as to whether a state could ever meet such a
high standard and because of the inherent lack of certainty in diagnosis); supra
Part III.B (arguing that Wendland requires a level of proof that can rarely be
met).
255
Addington, 441 U.S. at 428-29 (noting that “layers of professional
review and observation of the patient’s condition, and the concern of family
and friends generally will provide continuous opportunities for an erroneous
commitment to be corrected”).
250
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hydration met all of the requirements of due process, and should
have been honored by the court. Rose based her decision on what
she believed Robert would have wanted, considering his values,
beliefs and statements about medical care.256 Her evidence was
more than sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that Robert would have wanted his treatment discontinued,257 and
a preponderance of the evidence is all that should have been
required.258 The family members who supported her decision had
demonstrated the strongest emotional ties to Robert, while those
opposed were estranged from him.259 His physician, the
institutional ethics committee, his guardian ad litem and the
county patient ombudsman all supported the decision.260 Thus,
256

In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 174 (Cal. 2001) (recognizing that “[t]he
trial court . . . found by clear and convincing evidence that [Rose] had acted
‘in good faith, based on medical evidence and after consideration of the
conservatee’s best interests, including his likely wishes, based on his previous
statements’”). See supra Part II.A (describing Robert’s statements to Rose and
the support she received from the medical hierarchy).
257
See supra text accompanying notes 97-103 (describing Robert’s
statements). In addition, Rose was Robert’s wife and presumptively knew his
wishes and values better than anyone else. See Hamann, supra note 205, at
165. Hamann states that
what is unclear to the judge, who is a stranger, may be obvious to a
family member who understands the person’s attitudes towards
medical care and general view of life and the world. The family
knows “the motives and considerations that would control the
patient’s medical decisions.” There is a special bond between family
members based on their shared experience that allows them to
understand each other much better than those outside the family
understand them. Nonetheless, this knowledge is often intuitive,
causing difficulties when family members attempt to translate this
knowledge into evidence to be presented at a hearing.
Id. (citations omitted).
258
See supra notes 240-55 and accompanying text (discussing the
purposes for different standards of proof and concluding that clear and
convincing evidence is neither required nor desirable to effectuate a patient’s
wishes).
259
See supra note 113 and accompanying text (describing Robert’s
relationship with his family).
260
Wendland, 28 P.3d. at 155-56 (acknowledging such support but
choosing to downplay the support of the guardian ad litum by referring only to
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Rose met the burden that is appropriate in such cases and Robert
had the safeguard of multiple layers of professional review.261
The Wendland court, however, misperceived its role and set a
standard designed to allow for withdrawal of treatment only when
there is little, if any, doubt that the decision is precisely what the
patient would have chosen.262 Such exactitude is not required by
due process,263 and the attempt to achieve it violates the very
autonomy on which the court based the standard.264 This attempt
to honor autonomy has the contradictory result that patients who
would have refused treatment no longer have the right to have
their family assert that choice on their behalf.
E. Recommendations to the Legislature
California’s legislature must respond to Wendland to protect
incompetent patients from receiving care they likely would have
refused.265 The legislature should amend the HCDA to specify
Rose “for brevity’s sake”); see also In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555
(Ct. App. 2000).
261
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (relying on professional
review to decrease the possibility of erroneous decisions).
262
See Wendland, 28 P.3d at 172 (noting that the purpose of requiring
clear statements is to effectuate the wishes of the patient).
263
See Hamann, supra note 205, at 146-47 (noting that courts often refuse
to discontinue medical treatment because of the risk of error, but that absolute
certainty is not required by the law).
264
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 168.
265
See supra note 196 (citing sources noting that studies show that
patients would choose to refuse treatment more often than their surrogates
would refuse it for them). In amending the act, the legislature should address
the areas of decision making that satisfy due process concerns but that keep
such cases out of court. While there are currently procedural safeguards in
place in California, many of those safeguards are optional or apply only in
limited circumstances. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4659 (Deering 2001)
(prohibiting persons with certain conflicts of interest from serving as agents
under a power of attorney for health care or acting as surrogates); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 4674 (Deering 2001) (prohibiting persons with certain conflicts of
interest from serving as witnesses to written advance directives); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 4675 (Deering 2001) (requiring the signature of a patient advocate or
ombudsman to written advance directives executed by patients in skilled
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that, absent proof to the contrary, the family is the basic unit
within which health care decisions should be made.266 The
legislature should specify a process for selecting surrogates for
patients who have not appointed surrogates and give validity to
the informal decision-making process that is in place in
California.267
It should be made clear that the same process applies to all
types of decisions, including the refusal of life-sustaining medical
treatment for minimally conscious patients. Section 2355,
providing for the use of the patient’s prior instructions and
wishes and values, to the extent known, should be reaffirmed.268
Amendments to section 2355 could include guidance for the

nursing facilities); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4677 (Deering 2001) (prohibiting
health care providers, insurers, etc., from requiring or prohibiting the
execution of advance health care directives as a condition for providing service
or coverage); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4697 (Deering 2001) (automatically
revoking the designation of a spouse as agent to make health care decisions on
the dissolution or annulment of the marriage). Nothing in the Probate Code
provides for physician or ethics committee review of decisions to refuse
treatment on behalf of incompetent patients. See generally CAL. PROB. CODE
§§ 4600-4805 (constituting the state’s Health Care Decisions Law).
266
Hamann, supra note 205, at 169 (arguing that a “rebuttable
presumption that family members act in the person’s best interest allows the
rare cases involving abuse to be litigated”); accord Nancy K. Rhoden,
Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1988); HILDE
LINDEMANN NELSON & JAMES LINDEMANN NELSON, THE PATIENT IN THE
FAMILY 6-25 (1995) (describing the evolution of the participation of families
in the medical care of family members).
267
Health Care Decisions Act: Hearing on A.B. 891 Before the Senate
Rules Comm., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 26, 1999). See also Herald,
supra note 176, at 214 (arguing that the “default position” in the absence of a
patient directive should be to honor the decisions of close family members and
life partners). Alternatively, the legislature could require a consensus-based
model. Thomas L. Hafemeister, End-of-Life Decision Making, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, and Preventive Law: Hierarchical v. Consensus-Based
Decision-Making Model, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 329 (1999) (arguing that a
consensus of family, the patient and health care providers in end-of-life
decision making would respect the intent and needs of the patient while also
preserving family relationships and reducing litigation).
268
See generally CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355 (Deering 2001).
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determination of a patient’s best interests.269 The legislature
should specifically recognize advance directives and health care
proxies as merely an opportunity for those few who desire to
control their future treatment or identify a specific decision
maker to do so. This schema would respect the choice of the
majority who want their family to make decisions for them, and
also protect those for whom this is not the best choice.270
Amendments to the HCDA could mandate safeguards to
prevent decisions made with suspect motives.271 Such safeguards
269

See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (stating that
treatment may be withdrawn without any evidence of the patient’s wishes
when the patient is in “recurring unavoidable and severe pain”). Best interests
considerations could include the “relief of suffering, the preservation or
restoration of functioning and the . . . extent of life sustained.” Boozang,
supra note 161, at 581. Other considerations could include:
Patient’s present level of physical, sensory, emotional, and cognitive
functioning . . . the degree of humiliation, dependence, and loss of
dignity probably resulting from the condition and treatment; the life
expectancy and prognosis for recovery with and without treatment;
the various treatment options; and the risks, side effects, and benefits
of each of those options.
Div. of Family Serv. v. Carroll, No. CN00-09299, 2000 WL 33324536, at *
12 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept. 19, 2000). Some commentators have proposed that
the family’s interests should also be considered. See, e.g., Fentiman, supra
note 194. Many people factor such considerations into their own decisions for
themselves. Channick, supra note 195, at 639. One pair of commentators
suggests that a best interests analysis should ask the following question:
Does this woman, as she is now, experience something good when
her hair is brushed or when she sits in the sunlight, when she tastes
split-pea soup or feels the caress of a nurse’s hand—and is this of
sufficient value to her to count as a reason to go on?
LINDEMANN NELSON & LINDEMANN NELSON, supra note 266, at 89.
270
Provision already exists for those who wish to prevent participation in
decisions by certain people. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 4715 (Deering 2001)
(providing for the patient’s disqualification of specific individuals from serving
as surrogates). See supra note 230 and accompanying text (noting that most
adults would choose to have family members make treatment decisions in the
event of incapacity).
271
But see Hamann, supra note 205, at 151-54 (arguing that “there is no
evidence . . . that families are allowing financial concerns to override the best
interests of the person when making medical care decisions”).
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could include mandatory involvement of healthcare providers in
assessing the motives of the decision maker,272 ethics committee
involvement in assisting the parties to consider the issues in
assessing motives,273 and mediation of disputes.274 Additionally,
272

See Boozang, supra note 161, at 554 (arguing that “[h]ealth care teams
are well-attuned to such issues and have legal and ethical consultants as well as
bioethics committees at their disposal for consultation in case of any question
about the family’s motivation or decision”). In essence, this would simply be a
variation on the ethical concept of informed consent, adding the requirement
that surrogates express their reasons for the decisions they choose. See
CLINICAL ETHICS, supra note 219, at 89-100 (discussing the concept of
informed consent). To address the court’s concern about the basis for the
decisions, the legislature should provide guidance for determining whether a
surrogate is acting in good faith, and define what would constitute abuse of
discretion. Other considerations may include “preservation or restoration of
functioning, quality and extent of life sustained, satisfaction of present desires,
opportunities for future satisfaction, and the possibility of developing or
regaining the capacity for self-determination.” Deborah K. McKnight and
Maureen Bellis, Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatment for Adult,
Developmentally Disabled, Public Wards: A Proposed Statute, 18 AM. J.L. &
MED. 203, 210 (1992). For example, the legislature could require clinicians
who receive requests from surrogates to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment to “ensure that an accurate diagnosis and prognosis has been made,
that the family is truly representing the patient interests, and that those patients
without close family members or friends to act on their behalf are not
abandoned.” Fentiman, supra note 194, at 856. For an example of legislation
incorporating safeguards against inappropriate treatment refusals by
surrogates, see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2963, 2965, 2972 (2002)
(requiring physicians to assess the capacity of the patient prior to accepting a
surrogate’s decision to refuse to consent to the provision of cardiopulmonary
resuscitation [CPR] in the event of cardiac and pulmonary arrest; limiting the
circumstances under which the decision can be made; requiring a second
physician’s concurrence that those circumstances exist; requiring witnesses to
the decision; and providing for dispute resolution procedures prior to court
intervention). For safeguards required by courts, see In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1109 (N.J. 1985) (requiring ombudsman approval for decisions to forgo
treatment made on behalf of nursing home residents); In re Grant, 747 P.2d
445 (Wash. 1987) (requiring that two physicians agree that the patient is in an
advanced stage of a terminal and permanent illness).
273
See Boozang, supra note 161, at 553 (noting that bioethics committees
are available for consultation in case of “any question about the family’s
motivation or decision”).
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appointment of a guardian ad litem could be required for those
cases in which the procedures fail to resolve a dispute.275 The
legislature should provide that the role of the courts in disputes
should be limited to ascertaining whether the procedural
safeguards were met, and that the court should not substitute it’s
own determination of the best decision when due process
safeguards are in place.276
CONCLUSION
The Wendland court misapprehended the scope of its
decision, the means necessary to honor autonomy, the usefulness
of advance directives to mitigate the decision’s negative effects
and the need to require clear and convincing evidence. The court
failed to recognize that its perception of individual autonomy in
the context of health care decisions for incompetent patients is
out of sync with that of the majority of adults in this country. As
a result, the court incorrectly balanced patients’ right to life and
right to refuse medical treatment and violated the very autonomy
it sought to protect.
The California legislature must now respond and amend the
HCDA to restore the role of those closest to the patient in the
decision making process. The amendments should focus on the
family as the proper locus for such decisions, make a clear
statement that the preponderance of the evidence is sufficient,
and rely on procedural safeguards to detect rare decisions made
out of improper motives. Such a framework is consistent with the

274

See, e.g., Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life:
Mediating End-of-Life Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of PhysicianPatient Relationships, 79 B.U.L. REV. 1091 (1999) (discussing the use of
mediation in medical decision making); see also Diane E. Hoffman, Mediating
Life and Death Decisions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 821 (1994).
275
Herald, supra note 176, at 214 (arguing that independent attorneys can
be appointed to stand up for the patient’s rights).
276
See THOMAS L. HAFEMEISTER & PAULA L. HANNAFORD, RESOLVING
DISPUTES OVER LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT app. B, at 125-29 (1996)
(describing examples of state-mandated models for resolution of disagreements
regarding medical decisions).
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choices of most patients and would reduce the risk of error.

